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ESOPs, takeover protection, and corporate decision-making

Author

Listed:
  • William Pugh
  • John Jahera
  • Sharon Oswald

Abstract

ESOPs have the potential to align the interests of employees and owners and may increase firm value. However, employee ownership may also strengthen the position of entrenched management. The literature predicts that firms newly protected from takeover threat will tend to (1) increase long-term investment and (2) require additional external monitoring, and/or (3) may use leverage as part of an overall antitakeover strategy. We examined firms that have adopted ESOPs and find that firms raise the level of capital expenditures, research and development expenditures, and dividends. (JEF G320) Copyright Springer 1999

Suggested Citation

  • William Pugh & John Jahera & Sharon Oswald, 1999. "ESOPs, takeover protection, and corporate decision-making," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 23(2), pages 170-183, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jecfin:v:23:y:1999:i:2:p:170-183
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02745951
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Ansgar Richter & Susanne Schrader, 2017. "Levels of Employee Share Ownership and the Performance of Listed Companies in Europe," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 55(2), pages 396-420, June.
    3. Hanen Maalej & Mohamed Triki, 2008. "Déterminants de la pratique de l'actionnariat salarié dans les entreprises françaises," Post-Print halshs-00525419, HAL.
    4. Nawar Hashem & Mehmet Ugur, 2013. "Corporate governance and innovation in US-listed firms: the mediating effects of market concentration," Chapters, in: Mehmet Ugur (ed.), Governance, Regulation and Innovation, chapter 4, pages 86-121, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Thierry Poulain-Rehm & Xavier Lepers, 2012. "Does Employee Ownership Benefit Value Creation? The Case of France (2001–2005)," Post-Print hal-01382074, HAL.
    6. Thierry Poulain-Rehm & Xavier Lepers, 2013. "Does Employee Ownership Benefit Value Creation? The Case of France (2001–2005)," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 112(2), pages 325-340, January.
    7. Hall, Bronwyn H. & Lerner, Josh, 2010. "The Financing of R&D and Innovation," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 609-639, Elsevier.
    8. Hélène Cardoni & Thierry Poulain-Rehm, 2023. "The impact of employee shareholding on corporate governance: the employee shareholder director in France," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 27(4), pages 1073-1114, December.
    9. Zied Guedri & Xavier Hollandts, 2008. "Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on Firm Performance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 460-474, September.
    10. Hélène Cardoni, 2020. "Contribution to the knowledge of the impact of employee share ownership on corporate governance [Contribution à la connaissance de l'impact de l'actionnariat salarié sur la gouvernance des entrepri," Post-Print halshs-02556417, HAL.
    11. Tylecote, Andrew & Ramirez, Paulina, 2006. "Corporate governance and innovation: The UK compared with the US and 'insider' economies," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 160-180, February.
    12. Felippe Clemente, 2021. "Analysis of the Brazilian tax incentives to innovation and patent data: a Principal-Agent model approach," Revista Finanzas y Politica Economica, Universidad Católica de Colombia, vol. 13(2), pages 403-437, August.
    13. Philippe Desbrières, 2002. "Les actionnaires salariés," Revue française de gestion, Lavoisier, vol. 141(5), pages 255-281.
    14. Bruno van Pottelsberghe, 2011. "Corporate governance practices and companies' R&D orientation- evidence from European countries," Working Papers 492, Bruegel.
    15. Xavier Hollandts & Nicolas Aubert & Abdelmehdi Ben Abdelhamid & Victor Prieur, 2018. "Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on CEO entrenchment," Post-Print halshs-01495427, HAL.
    16. Xavier Hollandts & Nicolas Aubert & Abdelmehdi Abdelhamid & Victor Prieur, 2017. "Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on CEO entrenchment," Working Papers halshs-01495427, HAL.

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