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Dividends, Corporate Monitors and Agency Costs

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  • Kenneth A. Borokhovich
  • Kelly R. Brunarski
  • Yvette Harman
  • James B. Kehr

Abstract

We report new evidence on the hypothesis that dividends reduce agency costs. Consistent with dividends as a mechanism to reduce agency costs, we find that, on average, firms with a majority of strict outside directors on their boards experience significantly lower mean abnormal returns around the announcements of sizeable dividend increases. Our results are robust to multivariate controls for firm size, leverage, ownership, growth options, and change in dividend yield. However, we find no evidence that dividend increases reduce agency costs as measured by poison pills or outside blockholdings.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth A. Borokhovich & Kelly R. Brunarski & Yvette Harman & James B. Kehr, 2005. "Dividends, Corporate Monitors and Agency Costs," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 40(1), pages 37-65, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:finrev:v:40:y:2005:i:1:p:37-65
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0732-8516.2005.00092.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Hui Liang James & Hongxia Wang, 2021. "Independent director tenure and dividends," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(5-6), pages 1057-1091, May.
    2. repec:mth:ijafr8:v:8:y:2018:i:2:p:179-211 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Blau, Benjamin M. & Fuller, Kathleen P. & Van Ness, Robert A., 2011. "Short selling around dividend announcements and ex-dividend days," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 628-639, June.
    4. Hussein Abedi Shamsabadi & Byung-Seong Min & Richard Chung, 2016. "Corporate governance and dividend strategy: lessons from Australia," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 12(5), pages 583-610, October.
    5. Anthonia T. Odeleye, 2018. "Quality of Corporate Governance on Dividend Payouts: The Case of Nigeria," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 30(1), pages 19-32, March.
    6. Mehmet Levent Erdaş & Emel Bachá Sımoes, 2020. "The Relationship between Audit Mechanisms and Dividend Payout Policy within the Framework of Corporate Governance: The Case of Turkey," Journal of Economy Culture and Society, Istanbul University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 62(62), pages 255-284, December.
    7. Muhammad Sadiq Shahid, PhD & Dr.Faid Gul & Muhammad Rizwan & Muhammad Hassan Bucha, PhD, 2016. "Ownership Structure, Board Size, Board Composition And Dividend Policy: New Evidence From Two Emerging Markets," IBT Journal of Business Studies (JBS), Ilma University, Faculty of Management Science, vol. 12(2), pages 25-36.
    8. Bradley Benson & Travis Davidson & Hui James & Hongxia Wang, 2022. "Board busyness and corporate payout: are all busy directors the same?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(3), pages 3711-3759, September.
    9. Mehmet Levent Erdaş & Emel Bachá Sımoes, 2020. "The Relationship between Audit Mechanisms and Dividend Payout Policy within the Framework of Corporate Governance: The Case of Turkey," Journal of Economy Culture and Society, Istanbul University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 62(0), pages 255-284, December.
    10. Anna Białek-Jaworska & Natalia Nehrebecka, 2016. "Determinants of Polish Enterprises' Propensity to Lease," Working Papers 2016-07, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    11. Jean-Michel Sahut & Frédéric Teulon, 2017. "What are the determinants of dividend policies? A new perspective in Emerging Markets," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(3), pages 2234-2246.
    12. Tasawar Nawaz & Roszaini Haniffa & Mohammad Hudaib, 2023. "From boots to suits: do military directors protect shareholders’ wealth?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 1479-1511, November.
    13. Éric Vernier & Régis Dumoulin & Hodonou Dannon, 2017. "Diversité du conseil d'administration et politique de dividende des grands groupes bancaires systémiques : théories et investigations empiriques," Post-Print hal-01856607, HAL.
    14. Abdul Moin & Yilmaz Guney & Izidin El Kalak, 2020. "The effects of ownership structure, sub-optimal cash holdings and investment inefficiency on dividend policy: evidence from Indonesia," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 857-900, October.

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