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Ordnung

Author

Listed:
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter
  • Kirstein, Roland

Abstract

Der Beitrag stellt die Bedeutung von Handlungsbeschränkungen für die Erwartungsstabilisierung und Koordination von Handlungen heraus. An einem einfachen Modell aus der evolutorischen Spieltheorie wird die Bildung von Konventionen und deren Bedeutung für die Reduktion von Transaktionskosten erläutert.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmidtchen, Dieter & Kirstein, Roland, 1999. "Ordnung," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 99-10, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:9910
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23106/1/9910ordn.pdf
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    Other versions of this item:

    • Dieter Schmidtchen & Roland Kirstein, 2012. "Ordnung," FEMM Working Papers 120001, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Ostrom, Elinor, 2009. "An Agenda for the Study of Institutions," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 89-110, December.
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    5. -, 1986. "Agenda = Agenda," Series Históricas 8749, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    6. Deakin, S., 2011. "Legal Evolution: Integrating Economic and Systemic Approaches," Working Papers wp424, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
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    8. Robert Sugden, 2005. "Spontaneous Order," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, chapter 1, pages 1-9, Palgrave Macmillan.
    9. Heiner, Ronald A, 1983. "The Origin of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 560-595, September.
    10. Riker, William H., 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 432-446, June.
    11. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 1347-1374, September.
    12. Kunz, Harald, 1985. "Marktsystem und Information," Untersuchungen zur Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen;Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg, Germany, edition 1, volume 20, number urn:isbn:9783163449169, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolutorische Ökonomik; Spontane Ordnung; Transaktionskosten;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

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