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Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems

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  • ELINOR OSTROM

    (Indiana University, Bloomington)

Abstract

This article presents an alternative approach to the development of a general theory of microconstitutional choice. The goal of the alternative approach is to identify conditions that affect the likelihood that individuals who face a common-pool resource dilemma will extract themselves from the situation by changing the rules affecting the structure of the situation. These conditions are viewed as variables affected by a situation rather than as assumptions or constants. Situations vary in their capability to generate better or worse information to fallible, learning individuals in the extent to which individuals share norms, in the symmetry of their interests, and in the type of rules regulating entry and use of common-pool resources. Predictions should be based on the specific configuration of these situation-specific variables.

Suggested Citation

  • Elinor Ostrom, 1989. "Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(1), pages 11-50, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:11-50
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463189001001004
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    Cited by:

    1. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1991. "Koordination durch Verhandlungssysteme: Analytische Konzepte und institutionelle Lösungen am Beispiel der Zusammenarbeit zwischen zwei Bundesländern," MPIfG Discussion Paper 91/4, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    2. Roy Gardner & Elinor Ostrom & James M. Walker, 1990. "The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(3), pages 335-358, July.
    3. Zintl, Reinhard, 1991. "Kooperation und die Aufteilung des Kooperationsgewinns bei horizontaler Politikverflechtung," MPIfG Discussion Paper 91/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    4. Benz, Arthur, 1991. "Mehr-Ebenen-Verflechtung: Politische Prozesse in verbundenen Entscheidungsarenen," MPIfG Discussion Paper 91/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    5. Anderson, C. Leigh & Swimmer, Eugene, 1997. "Some empirical evidence on property rights of first peoples," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-22, May.
    6. Fritz W. Scharpf, 1991. "Games Real Actors Could Play: The Challenge of Complexity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(3), pages 277-304, July.
    7. Benz, Arthur & Scharpf, Fritz W. & Zintl, Reinhard, 1992. "Horizontale Politikverflechtung: Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 10, number 10.
    8. Ip Eric, 2012. "A Positive Theory of Constitutional Judicial Review: Evidence from Singapore and Taiwan," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(4), pages 1-43, January.
    9. Jill K. Clark & Kristen Lowitt & Charles Z. Levkoe & Peter Andrée, 2021. "The power to convene: making sense of the power of food movement organizations in governance processes in the Global North," Agriculture and Human Values, Springer;The Agriculture, Food, & Human Values Society (AFHVS), vol. 38(1), pages 175-191, February.
    10. Braadbaart, Okke & Braadbaart, Frederick, 1997. "Policing the urban pumping race: Industrial groundwater overexploitation in Indonesia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 199-210, February.
    11. Fritz W. Scharpf, 1990. "Games Real Actors Could Play," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(4), pages 471-494, October.

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