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Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style

Author

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  • Denzau, Arthur
  • Riker, William
  • Shepsle, Kenneth

Abstract

This article is aimed at integrating two kinds of analysis of legislators' calculations of advantage. We assume that legislators operate in two arenas, in the legislative arena itself, where their calculations of advantage concern simply their effectiveness in voting (Farquharson), and in the electoral arena, where their calculations concern the rewards for their position-taking as well as their effectiveness (Fenno). Our analysis is introduced by an interpretation of voting on the Powell amendment, 1956, when some legislators apparently voted strategically and others, equally able to do so, still did not. We then develop an expected utility model of voting that accounts for such divergent choices in terms of legislators' individual beliefs about the distribution of opinions in the legislature (Farquharson) and in their constituencies (Fenno). We conclude with an analysis of the Nash equilibria of choices to vote strategically or nonstrategically.

Suggested Citation

  • Denzau, Arthur & Riker, William & Shepsle, Kenneth, 1985. "Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(4), pages 1117-1134, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:04:p:1117-1134_23
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    Cited by:

    1. Bhaskar Dutta & Matthew O. Jackson & Michel Le Breton, 2004. "Equilibrium agenda formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(1), pages 21-57, August.
    2. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu, 2020. "The failure of a Nazi “killer” amendment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 133-149, April.
    3. Kathleen Bawn & Gregory Koger, 2008. "Effort, Intensity and Position Taking," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 67-92, January.
    4. Fritz W. Scharpf, 1991. "Games Real Actors Could Play: The Challenge of Complexity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(3), pages 277-304, July.
    5. Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2010. "The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(1), pages 85-122, January.
    6. Keith L. Dougherty & Grace Pittman, 2022. "Congressional apportionment and the fourteenth amendment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 115-126, July.
    7. George Tsebelis, 1990. "Elite Interaction and Constitution Building in Consociational Democracies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 5-29, January.
    8. Alex Gershkov & Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2019. "The Art of Compromising: Voting with Interdependent Values and the Flag of the Weimar Republic," Working Papers tecipa-645, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    9. moldovanu, benny, 2018. "A Nazi †Killer†Amendment," CEPR Discussion Papers 13260, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Zürn, Michael, 1989. "Das CoCom-Regime: zum Erklärungswert rationalistischer Theorien," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 105-149.
    11. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7723 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Douglass C. North, 1990. "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 355-367, October.
    13. Lee Epstein & Olga Shvetsova, 2002. "Heresthetical Maneuvering on the US Supreme Court," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(1), pages 93-122, January.
    14. Ellison, Sara Fisher & Mullin, Wallace P, 1995. "Economics and Politics: The Case of Sugar Tariff Reform," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 335-366, October.
    15. Alessandro Riboni, 2013. "Ideology and endogenous constitutions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(3), pages 885-913, April.
    16. Bjørn Rasch, 2014. "Insincere voting under the successive procedure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 499-511, March.
    17. Zürn, Michael, 1989. "Geschäft und Sicherheit: das CoCom-Regime und Theorien über Kooperationen in den internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen," EconStor Research Reports 112665, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    18. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1989. "Games Real Actors Could Play: The Problem of Complete Information," MPIfG Discussion Paper 89/9, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    19. Fritz W. Scharpf, 1990. "Games Real Actors Could Play," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(4), pages 471-494, October.
    20. Byung‐Jae Lee & Tae Wan Kim & Jaekwon Suh & O. Fiona Yap, 2021. "Local government performance and democratic consolidation: Explaining ordinance proposal in Busan Metropolitan Council," Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 15-41, January.
    21. Keith Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2012. "Voting for Pareto optimality: a multidimensional analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 655-678, June.

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