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Conjoint Analysis of Negotiator Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Leonard Greenhalg

    (The Amos Tuck School of Business Administration Dartmouth College)

  • Scott A. Neslin

    (The Amos Tuck School of Business Administration Dartmouth College)

Abstract

Negotiator preferences are a universal element of conflict resolution theories, but have posed problems of operationalization which have hampered empirical verification and development of the theories. Conjoint analysis is proposed as a method for assessing the preferences of negotiators and their constituencies generally, and union, management, and employee preferences in a collective bargaining context, specifically. The technique is useful to researchers and practitioners in that it is easier to apply than Von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) utility theory, and provides more information than simple issueprioritizing techniques. Conjoint analysis is used to analyze a simulated contract negotiation and shown to be both practical and valid. The technique is described and assessed; research and practical application are suggested in the areas of contract negotiation and third party intervention. An application of the technique for testing the Nash (1953) model of bargaining is included as an illustration of the technique's usefulness.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonard Greenhalg & Scott A. Neslin, 1981. "Conjoint Analysis of Negotiator Preferences," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 25(2), pages 301-327, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:25:y:1981:i:2:p:301-327
    DOI: 10.1177/002200278102500205
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. John R. Hauser & Steven M. Shugan, 1977. "Efficient Measurement of Consumer Preference Functions: A General Theory for Intensity of Preference," Discussion Papers 285, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Green, Paul E & Devita, Michael T, 1975. "An Interaction Model of Consumer Utility," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 2(2), pages 146-153, Se.
    4. Barnett R. Parker & V. Srinivasan, 1976. "A Consumer Preference Approach to the Planning of Rural Primary Health-Care Facilities," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 24(5), pages 991-1025, October.
    5. Green, Paul E & Srinivasan, V, 1978. "Conjoint Analysis in Consumer Research: Issues and Outlook," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 5(2), pages 103-123, Se.
    6. Hauser, John R & Urban, Glen L, 1979. "Assessment of Attribute Importances and Consumer Utility Functions: von Neumann-Morgenstern Theory Applied to Consumer Behavior," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 5(4), pages 251-262, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alice F. Stuhlmacher & Mary Kay Stevenson, 1997. "Using Policy Modeling to Describe the Negotiation Exchange," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 317-337, July.

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