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Using Policy Modeling to Describe the Negotiation Exchange

Author

Listed:
  • Alice F. Stuhlmacher

    (DePaul University)

  • Mary Kay Stevenson

    (California State University-Hayward)

Abstract

This is a study of the points of view in a negotiation. Policy modeling, a new method for understanding utilities, is discussed. With policy modeling, the importance weights, subjective values, and a trade-off strategy were estimated from prenegotiation ratings. With these parameters, the values of unfamiliar offers made during a negotiation then also could be estimated. The utility models of the individual negotiators allowed display of the pattern or “dance” of offers of a particular negotiation. These graphs showed a surprising stability of utilities prior to and during the negotiation. Individual negotiator's offers and perceptions of the opponent's offers during negotiation were consistent with the utility predicted from the policy model. Results are discussed in terms of the important role of utilities in negotiation and the potential for this new method to examine variables that may influence, or cause a departure from, the stability of utilities during negotiation.

Suggested Citation

  • Alice F. Stuhlmacher & Mary Kay Stevenson, 1997. "Using Policy Modeling to Describe the Negotiation Exchange," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 317-337, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:6:y:1997:i:4:d:10.1023_a:1008660711275
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008660711275
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Rudolf Vetschera, 2006. "Preference Structures of Negotiators and Negotiation Outcomes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 111-125, March.
    2. Alice F. Stuhlmacher & Matthew V. Champagne, 2000. "The Impact of Time Pressure and Information on Negotiation Process and Decisions," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 9(6), pages 471-491, November.

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