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Hukou Status and Individual-Level Labor Market Discrimination: An Experiment in China

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  • Uwe Dulleck
  • Jonas Fooken
  • Yumei He

Abstract

This article examines discrimination based on hukou status, a legal construct that segregates locals and migrants in urban China. Local and migrant household helpers were recruited as experimental participants to interact in a standard gift exchange game (GEG) as well as a new variant of the GEG, called the wage promising game (WPG). The WPG uses non-binding wage offers and final wages that employers set after observing effort. In the GEG, both statistical and preference-based discrimination may motivate employers to offer lower wages to migrants than to locals, whereas in the WPG the statistical motive is excluded. Results reveal discrimination against migrants and show that preference-based discrimination is an important employer motive.

Suggested Citation

  • Uwe Dulleck & Jonas Fooken & Yumei He, 2020. "Hukou Status and Individual-Level Labor Market Discrimination: An Experiment in China," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 73(3), pages 628-649, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:73:y:2020:i:3:p:628-649
    DOI: 10.1177/0019793919887118
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    Cited by:

    1. Xin Fan & Shan Jin & Zeyu Chen, 2023. "Who Benefits from Domestic Market Integration?," Journal of Happiness Studies, Springer, vol. 24(6), pages 2083-2109, August.
    2. Thomas Vendryes & Jiaqi Zhan, 2023. "Hukou-Based Discrimination, Dialects and City Characteristics," Documents de recherche 23-04, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
    3. Jie Chen & Wei Wang & Yan Song, 2023. "Economic Potential Gain, Income Uncertainty, and Rural Migrants’ Urban Homeownership: Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(9), pages 1-22, April.

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