IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/apecpp/v32y2010i3p436-455..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Non-Tariff Measures in Agri-Food Trade: What Do the Data Tell Us? Evidence from a Cluster Analysis on OECD Imports

Author

Listed:
  • Anne-Célia Disdier
  • Frank van Tongeren

Abstract

Non-tariff measures (NTMs) play an increasing role in the international trade of agri-food products. Although well-recognized, this role has not been extensively analyzed at a disaggregated level. This paper focuses on NTMs enacted by member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development for 777 products. Using a cluster-analysis, the paper identifies the correlation between the occurrence of NTMs, their trade coverage, and the incidence of trade frictions for these products. The paper relates the statistical findings to the political economy literature on protection to explain cross-product differences in the occurrence of NTMs and trade frictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne-Célia Disdier & Frank van Tongeren, 2010. "Non-Tariff Measures in Agri-Food Trade: What Do the Data Tell Us? Evidence from a Cluster Analysis on OECD Imports," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 32(3), pages 436-455.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:apecpp:v:32:y:2010:i:3:p:436-455.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/aepp/ppq008
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
    2. Giovanni Facchini & Johannes Van Biesebroeck & Gerald Willmann, 2006. "Protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(3), pages 845-873, August.
    3. Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2013. "A quantile-based test of protection for sale model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 40-52.
    4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    5. Bénédicte Vidaillet & V. d'Estaintot & P. Abécassis, 2005. "Introduction," Post-Print hal-00287137, HAL.
    6. Bjørnskov, Christian & Lind, Kim Martin, 2002. "Where Do Developing Countries Go After Doha? An Analysis of WTO Positions and Potential Alliances," Conference papers 330993, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    7. Disdier, Anne-Celia & Fontagne, Lionel & Mimouni, Mondher, 2008. "AJAE Appendix: The Impact of Regulations on Agricultural Trade: Evidence from the SPS and TBT Agreements," American Journal of Agricultural Economics APPENDICES, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(2), pages 1-7.
    8. Valeria Costantini & Riccardo Crescenzi & Fabrizio De Filippis & Luca Salvatici, 2007. "Bargaining Coalitions in the WTO Agricultural Negotiations," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(5), pages 863-891, May.
    9. Bombardini, Matilde, 2008. "Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 329-348, July.
    10. Rigoberto A. Lopez & Xenia Matschke, 2006. "Food Protection for Sale," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(3), pages 380-391, August.
    11. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, September.
    12. Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 1, pages 3-21, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    13. Fischer, Ronald & Serra, Pablo, 2000. "Standards and protection," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 377-400, December.
    14. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    15. Diaz-Bonilla, Eugenio & Thomas, Marcelle & Robinson, Sherman & Cattaneo, Andrea, 2000. "Food security and trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization," TMD discussion papers 59, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    16. Ivanic, Maros & Martin, Will, 2008. "Implications of higher global food prices for poverty in low-income countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4594, The World Bank.
    17. Lionel Fontagné & Mondher Mimouni & Jean-Michel Pasteels, 2005. "Estimating the Impact of Environmental SPS and TBT on International Trade," Post-Print hal-00270511, HAL.
    18. Christian Bjørnskov & Kim Martin Lind, 2005. "Underlying Policies in the wto, the Harbinson Proposal and the Modalities Agreement," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 56(6), pages 1385-1412.
    19. Bruno Henry de Frahan & Mark Vancauteren, 2006. "Harmonisation of food regulations and trade in the Single Market: evidence from disaggregated data," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 33(3), pages 337-360, September.
    20. Kono, Daniel Y., 2006. "Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(3), pages 369-384, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fabio Gaetano Santeramo & Emilia Lamonaca, 2019. "The Effects of Non‐tariff Measures on Agri‐food Trade: A Review and Meta‐analysis of Empirical Evidence," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(3), pages 595-617, September.
    2. Beghin, John C. & Disdier, Anne-Celia & Marette, Stephan & van Tongeren, Frank, 2011. "Measuring Costs And Benefits Of Non-Tariff Measures In Agri-Food Trade," Staff General Research Papers Archive 32393, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    3. Hejazi, Mina & Grant, Jason H. & Peterson, Everett, 2022. "Trade impact of maximum residue limits in fresh fruits and vegetables," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    4. Jason H. Grant & Kathryn A. Boys, 2012. "Agricultural Trade and the GATT/WTO: Does Membership Make a Difference?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(1), pages 1-24.
    5. Pramila Crivelli & Jasmin Groeschl, 2016. "The Impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures on Market Entry and Trade Flows," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(3), pages 444-473, March.
    6. repec:lic:licosd:36315 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Yuan Li & John C. Beghin, 2017. "Protectionism indices for non-tariff measures: An application to maximum residue levels," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: John Christopher Beghin (ed.), Nontariff Measures and International Trade, chapter 10, pages 167-178, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. Boza, Sofía, 2013. "Assessing the impact of sanitary, phytosanitary and technical requirements on food and agricultural trade: what does current research tell us?," Papers 926, World Trade Institute.
    9. John C. Beghin & Heidi Schweizer, 2021. "Agricultural Trade Costs," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(2), pages 500-530, June.
    10. John C. Beghin & Miet Maertens & Johan Swinnen, 2017. "Nontariff Measures and Standards in Trade and Global Value Chains," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: John Christopher Beghin (ed.), Nontariff Measures and International Trade, chapter 2, pages 13-38, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    11. Xuqian Hu & Canfei He, 2020. "Nontariff measures, trade deflection, and market expansion of exporters in China," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 932-953, September.
    12. Ridley, William & Luckstead, Jeff & Devadoss, Stephen, 2022. "Wine: The punching bag in trade retaliation," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    13. Marette Stéphan, 2016. "Non-Tariff Measures When Alternative Regulatory Tools Can Be Chosen," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 1-17, May.
    14. Annalisa Zezza & Federica Demaria & Maria Rosaria Pupo d'Andrea & Jo Swinnen & Giulia Meloni & Senne Vandevelde & Alessandro Olper & Daniele Curzi & Valentina Raimondi & Sophie Drogue, 2018. "Research for AGRI Committee - Agricultural trade: assessing reciprocity of standards," Working Papers hal-02787948, HAL.
    15. Crivelli, Pramila & Gröschl, Jasmin, 2012. "SPS measures and trade: Implementation matters," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2012-05, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    16. Bo Xiong & John C. Beghin, 2017. "Stringent Maximum Residue Limits, Protectionism, and Competitiveness: The Cases of the US and Canada," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: John Christopher Beghin (ed.), Nontariff Measures and International Trade, chapter 12, pages 193-207, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    17. John C. Beghin & Miet Maertens & Johan Swinnen, 2017. "Nontariff Measures and Standards in Trade and Global Value Chains," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Nontariff Measures and International Trade, chapter 2, pages 13-38 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    18. Aida Gonzalez & Sophie Hélaine & Marie-Luise Rau & Monika Tothova, 2010. "Non-tariff measures affecting agro-food trade between the EU and Africa: Summary of a workshop," JRC Research Reports JRC62522, Joint Research Centre.
    19. Alia, Didier Y. & Zheng, Yuqing & Kusunose, Yoko & Reed, Michael R., 2017. "Trade effects of food regulations and standards: Assessing the impact of SPS measures on market structure," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 258368, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    20. Sofiane Ghali & Habib Zitouna & Zouhour Karray & Slim Driss, 2013. "Effects of NTMs on the Extensive and Intensive Margins to Trade: The Case of Tunisia and Egypt," Working Papers 820, Economic Research Forum, revised Dec 2013.
    21. José Manuel Álvarez Zárate (Editor), 2016. "¿Hacia dónde va América Latina respecto al derecho económico internacional?," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 860.
    22. Ridley, William & Luckstead, Jeff & Devadoss, Stephen, 2022. "Wine: The punching bag in trade retaliation," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    23. Vickie Siew Hoon Yew & Abul Quasem Al-Amin & Evelyn S. Devadason, 2020. "Labour Market Effects of Non-tariff Measures: A Computable General Equilibrium for the Food Processing Sector in Malaysia," The Indian Journal of Labour Economics, Springer;The Indian Society of Labour Economics (ISLE), vol. 63(3), pages 629-656, September.
    24. Grant, Jason & Arita, Shawn, 2017. "Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures: Assessment, Measurement, and Impact," Commissioned Papers 259417, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    25. Seok, Jun Ho & Saghaian, Sayed & Reed, Michael R., 2018. "The ‘Signaling Effect’ and the impact of high maximum residue limit standards on U.S. vegetable exports," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 150-159.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Juan Pablo Medina & Pablo García, 2009. "A Simple Global Perspective on the US Slowdown, Boom-Bust Cycles and the Rise of Protectionism," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 529, Central Bank of Chile.
    2. Olper, Alessandro, 2017. "The political economy of trade-related regulatory policy: environment and global value chain," Bio-based and Applied Economics Journal, Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA), vol. 5(3), February.
    3. Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2013. "A quantile-based test of protection for sale model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 40-52.
    4. Enrico Marvasi, 2013. "Protection for Sale, Monopolistic Competition and Variable Markups," Working Papers - Economics wp2013_11.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    5. Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2009. "Protection for sale or surge protection?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 675-688, August.
    6. Saha, Amrita, 2019. "Trade policy & lobbying effectiveness: Theory and evidence for India," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 165-192.
    7. Vincent Rebeyrol & Julien Vauday, 2008. "Live or let die : intra-sectoral lobbying on entry," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne bla08036, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    8. Barbara Annicchiarico & Enrico Marvasi, 2018. "Protection for Sale with Price Interactions and Incomplete Pass-Through," Working Papers LuissLab 18141, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli.
    9. Martimort, David, 2019. ""When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making," CEPR Discussion Papers 13843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Annicchiarico, Barbara & Marvasi, Enrico, 2019. "Protection for sale under monopolistic competition: Beyond the CES," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    11. Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2009. "Is protection really for sale? A survey and directions for future research," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 181-191, March.
    12. By Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2012. "Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 115-132, February.
    13. Francisco Candel-Sánchez & Juan Perote-Peña, 2018. "Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 23-47, January.
    14. Elena Paltseva, 2014. "Protection for Sale: The case of oligopolistic competition and interdependent sectors," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(4), pages 1195-1216, November.
    15. Uysal, Pinar & Yotov, Yoto V. & Zylkin, Thomas, 2015. "Firm heterogeneity and trade-induced layoffs: An empirical investigation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 80-97.
    16. Giovanni Facchini & Marcelo Olarreaga & Peri Silva & Gerald Willmann, 2010. "Substitutability and Protectionism: Latin America's Trade Policy and Imports from China and India," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 24(3), pages 446-473, June.
    17. Mirabelle Muûls & Dimitra Petropoulou, 2013. "A swing state theory of trade protection in the Electoral College," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 46(2), pages 705-724, May.
    18. Andrew Jonelis & Wisarut Suwanprasert, 2022. "Protection for sale: evidence from around the world," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 237-267, April.
    19. Daryna Grechyna, 2021. "Trade openness and political distortions," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 644-663, November.
    20. Andrey Stoyanov, 2016. "Regional Trade Agreements and Cross-border Lobbying: Empirical Evidence from the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement Negotiations," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 126-149, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • Q17 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agriculture in International Trade

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:apecpp:v:32:y:2010:i:3:p:436-455.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aaeaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.