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Political Economy of Agricultural Distortions

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  • Johan F. M. Swinnen

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  • Johan F. M. Swinnen, 2009. "Political Economy of Agricultural Distortions," World Bank Publications - Reports 28172, The World Bank Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wboper:28172
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    9. William A. Masters & Kym Anderson, 2009. "Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2607.
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    11. Olivier Cadot & Jaime de Melo & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2015. "Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Modeling Developing Countries' Policies in General Equilibrium, chapter 13, pages 295-316, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    12. Kym Anderson, 2009. "Distortions to Agricultural Versus Nonagricultural Producer Incentives," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 55-74, September.
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    24. Anderson, Kym, 2009. "Five Decades of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper Series 48742, World Bank.
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    28. Pushan Dutt & Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Endogenous trade policy through majority voting: an empirical investigation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 4, pages 67-93, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    29. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    30. Canice Prendergast, 2007. "The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 180-196, March.
    31. Johan F. M. Swinnen, 1994. "A Positive Theory of Agricultural Protection," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 76(1), pages 1-14.
    32. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, September.
    33. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, November.
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    36. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    37. Kym Anderson & Will Martin, 2009. "Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Asia," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2611.
    38. Robert Bates & William Rogerson, 1980. "Agriculture in development: A coalitional analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(5), pages 513-527, January.
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    40. Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 1, pages 3-21, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    41. Alessandro Olper, 2001. "Determinants of Agricultural Protection: The Role of Democracy and Institutional Setting Alessandro Olper," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 75-92, May.
    42. Anderson, Kym & Swinnen, Johan F.M., 2009. "Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Eastern Europe and Central Asia," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper Series 48624, World Bank.
    43. Marianna Belloc & Paolo Guerrieri, 2008. "Special Interest Groups and Trade Policy in the EU," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 457-478, September.
    44. Kym Anderson, 2009. "Distortions to Agricultural Incentives : A Global Perspective, 1955-2007," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 9436.
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