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Protection for Sale with Price Interactions and Incomplete Pass-Through

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We extend the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by introducing a general model of monopolistic competition with variable markups and incomplete pass-through. We show that the structure of protection emerging in the political equilibrium not only depends on the weight attached by the government to consumer welfare when making its policy decision, but also on the degree of market power of firms and on the terms-of-trade variations due to the degree of pass-through. Our results highlight the importance of demand characteristics in shaping the structure of protection and are consistent with the occurring of protectionism also in unorganized industries.

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  • Barbara Annicchiarico & Enrico Marvasi, 2018. "Protection for Sale with Price Interactions and Incomplete Pass-Through," CEIS Research Paper 435, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 08 Jun 2018.
    • Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:435
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Protection for Sale; Monopolistic Competition; Incomplete Pass-Through; Endogenous Markups.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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