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Kontrollok az önkormányzati hitelezésben - az elmúlt évtized tanulságai
[Controls in municipal borrowing in Hungary - A decade of experience]

Author

Listed:
  • Vasvári, Tamás
  • Pocsai, Erzsébet

Abstract

Az önkormányzati feladatok központosításával és az adósságkonszolidációval párhuzamosan a központi kormányzat aktív és passzív szabályozói eszközök bevezetésével próbálta elejét venni a szubnacionális szintről eredő újabb államháztartási kockázatoknak. Jelen tanulmány célja, hogy látleletet adjunk arról, hogyan alakult a bevezetett kontrollmechanizmusok hatására az önkormányzati rendszer pénzügyi helyzete, hitelkereslete és hitelkínálata a reform óta eltelt bő egy évtizedben. Eredményeink rámutatnak arra, hogy a bevezetett intézkedések államháztartási szempontból elérték céljukat: az önkormányzati adósság súlya európai összehasonlításban is rendkívül alacsony, az adósságállomány felépülése is mintegy harmadára lassult a reformot megelőző évtizedhez képest. Ennek megfelelően az önkormányzati szektor szerepe az önkormányzatokat finanszírozó bankok szempontjából az aktív (hitelezési) oldalról a passzív oldalra helyeződött át, amelyet így elsősorban likviditáskezelési megfontolások alakítanak. A 2022-ben tapasztalt gazdasági sokkok és kiugró költségvetési hiány azonban felhívják a figyelmet a központi transzferektől való túlzott függőség és a kifeszített gazdálkodás kockázataira. Az aktív kontroll az önkormányzati hiteltranzakciók felett sikeresen ellensúlyozta az adósságkonszolidáció pozitív hitelkínálati hatásait, ugyanakkor az államháztartási megfontolások mellett a politikai szempontok is jelentős szerepet kapnak a hitelügyletek jóváhagyása során.

Suggested Citation

  • Vasvári, Tamás & Pocsai, Erzsébet, 2024. "Kontrollok az önkormányzati hitelezésben - az elmúlt évtized tanulságai [Controls in municipal borrowing in Hungary - A decade of experience]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 881-914.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:2201
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2024.9.881
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing

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