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Political alignment and the allocation of the COVID-19 response funds—evidence from municipalities in Poland

Author

Listed:
  • Matuszak Piotr

    (Department of Macroeconomics and Development Studies, Poznań University of Economics and Business, al. Niepodległości 10, 61-875 Poznań)

  • Totleben Bartosz

    (Department of Macroeconomics and Development Studies, Poznań University of Economics and Business, al. Niepodległości 10, 61-875 Poznań)

  • Piątek Dawid

    (Department of Macroeconomics and Development Studies, Poznań University of Economics and Business, al. Niepodległości 10, 61-875 Poznań)

Abstract

This paper aims to analyse the allocation of the COVID-19 response funds from the perspective of the political alignment hypothesis. The authors focus on the allocation of the second and third rounds of the Governmental Fund for Local Investments (part of the COVID-19 Response Fund) in Poland. Using the logit and OLS models and the regression discontinuity design the authors show that mayors aligned with the central government were significantly more likely to receive the funds, as well as in higher per capita values, than mayors aligned with the opposition or unaligned with any party in parliament when the allocation was based on a discretionary decision. The results support the political alignment hypothesis and highlight the danger of partiality in the allocation of the COVID-19 response funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Matuszak Piotr & Totleben Bartosz & Piątek Dawid, 2022. "Political alignment and the allocation of the COVID-19 response funds—evidence from municipalities in Poland," Economics and Business Review, Sciendo, vol. 8(1), pages 50-71, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:ecobur:v:8:y:2022:i:1:p:50-71:n:4
    DOI: 10.18559/ebr.2022.1.4
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Banaszewska Monika & Bischoff Ivo, 2017. "The Political Economy of EU-funds: Evidence from Poland," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 237(3), pages 191-224, June.
    2. Brollo, Fernanda & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2012. "Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 742-761, November.
    3. Kauder, Björn & Björn, Kauder & Niklas, Potrafke & Markus, Reischmann, 2016. "Do politicians gratify core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant program," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145509, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political alignment; COVID-19 response funds; public spending;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures

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