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Targeting Benefits for Electoral Gain: Constituency Marginality and the Distribution of Grants to English Local Authorities

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  • Hugh Ward
  • Peter John

Abstract

We model the spatial allocation of resources over constituencies as an optimization problem in which governing parties face uncertainty about voter preferences, but seek to increase their chances of getting re‐elected. We show that a rational government should allocate extra resources to marginal constituencies and especially favour opposition‐held marginals. We test this hypothesis on data about central government grants to larger English local authorities. We consider whether Conservative controlled and ‘flagship’ local authorities also benefit. Our empirical results suggest that the government allocated around £500 million more to local authorities containing marginal constituencies and around £155 million more to ‘flagship’ local authorities than they could have been expected to get on the criteria of social need and population.

Suggested Citation

  • Hugh Ward & Peter John, 1999. "Targeting Benefits for Electoral Gain: Constituency Marginality and the Distribution of Grants to English Local Authorities," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 47(1), pages 32-52, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:47:y:1999:i:1:p:32-52
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00186
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    Cited by:

    1. Golden, M. & Picci, L., 2007. "Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953–1994," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0767, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Maffioli, Elisa M., 2021. "The political economy of health epidemics: Evidence from the Ebola outbreak," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    3. Vasvári, Tamás & Pocsai, Erzsébet, 2024. "Kontrollok az önkormányzati hitelezésben - az elmúlt évtized tanulságai [Controls in municipal borrowing in Hungary - A decade of experience]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 881-914.
    4. Casas, Agustin, 2020. "The electoral benefits of unemployment, clientelism and distributive politics," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    5. Lara E., Bernardo & Toro M., Sergio, 2019. "Tactical distribution in local funding: The value of an aligned mayor," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 74-89.
    6. Hanes, Niklas, 2007. "Temporary grant programmes in Sweden and central government behaviour," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 1160-1174, December.
    7. Gelvez, Juan David, 2024. "Does Crime Matter? The Politics of Crime Prevention in Colombia," OSF Preprints znyq5, Center for Open Science.
    8. Tamás Vasvári & Dóra Longauer, 2024. "Against the tide: how changes in political alignment affect grant allocation to municipalities in Hungary," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 198(3), pages 467-492, March.
    9. Yannis Psycharis & Stavroula Iliopoulou & Maria Zoi & Panagiotis Pantazis, 2021. "Beyond the socio‐economic use of fiscal transfers: The role of political factors in Greek intergovernmental grant allocations," Regional Science Policy & Practice, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 982-1008, June.

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