Fiscal behaviour in the European Union: rules, fiscal decentralization and government indebtedness
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- Cândida Ferreira, 2009. "Fiscal Behaviour in the European Union: Rules, Fiscal Decentralization and Government Indebtedness," Working Papers Department of Economics 2009/23, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
European Union; fiscal decentralization; fiscal regimes; fiscal rules; Panel data;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
- H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EEC-2009-05-30 (European Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2009-05-30 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MAC-2009-08-08 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2009-05-30 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2009-08-08 (Public Economics)
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