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What Makes Performance-Related Pay Schemes Work? Finnish Evidence

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  • Antti Kauhanen
  • Hannu Piekkola

Abstract

We analyze how features of performance-related pay (PRP) schemes affect their perceived motivational effects using a Finnish survey for upper white-collar employees from 1999. The results show that the following features are important for a successful PRP scheme: (i) the employees have to feel they are able to affect the outcomes; (ii) the organizational level of the performance measurement should be close to the employee: individual and team level performance measurement increase the probability that the scheme is perceived to be motivating; (iii) employees should be familiar with the performance measures; (iv) the level of payments should be high enough and rewards frequent enough. Levels below the median do not generate positive effects; (v) employees should participate in the design of the PRP scheme. Copyright Springer 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Antti Kauhanen & Hannu Piekkola, 2006. "What Makes Performance-Related Pay Schemes Work? Finnish Evidence," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 10(2), pages 149-177, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:149-177
    DOI: 10.1007/s10997-006-0005-z
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    Cited by:

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    2. Liang, Wen-Jung & Tseng, Ching-Chih & Wang, Kuang-Cheng Andy, 2011. "Location choice with delegation: Bertrand vs. Cournot competition," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1774-1781, July.
    3. Pinheiro Zebral, Laura, 2017. "The influence of leadership and payment for performance on individual performance," Journal of Applied Leadership and Management, Hochschule Kempten - University of Applied Sciences, Professional School of Business & Technology, vol. 5, pages 76-89.

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