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List Price Collusion

Author

Listed:
  • Willem H. Boshoff

    (Stellenbosch University)

  • Johannes Paha

    (Stellenbosch University
    Justus-Liebig-University Giessen)

Abstract

Firms sometimes collude by agreeing on increases in list prices. Yet, the efficacy of such list price collusion is subject to discussion as colluding firms might, in principle, deviate secretly from the elevated prices by granting their customers discounts. This article reviews cases of list price collusion in the USA and Europe, and it presents a theory of harm suggesting that a combination of anchoring, orientation on reference points, and loss aversion may render list price collusion effective in raising transaction prices—even if firms set transaction prices in a non-coordinated fashion.

Suggested Citation

  • Willem H. Boshoff & Johannes Paha, 2021. "List Price Collusion," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 393-409, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:21:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s10842-021-00360-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-021-00360-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Timo Klein & Bertram Neurohr, 2023. "Should Private Exchanges of List Price Information Be Presumed to Be Anticompetitive?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 33-57, June.
    2. Haan, Marco A. & Heijnen, Pim & Obradovits, Martin, 2023. "Competition with list prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 502-528.
    3. Enrique Andreu & Damien Neven & Salvatore Piccolo & Roberto Venturini, 2023. "Upstream conduct and price authority with competing organizations," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(4), pages 788-810, October.
    4. Harrington, Joseph E., 2022. "The Anticompetitiveness of a Private Information Exchange of Prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).

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