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Anchoring, Reference Prices, and List Price Collusion

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  • Paha, Johannes

Abstract

The firms in this model set non-binding list prices before competing for buyers by non-cooperatively granting discounts. Each firm has an incentive to set a high list price if, for example, the customers anchor their willingness-to-pay on the list price. However, list price competition occurs if customers are loss-averse with respect to firms charging above-average list prices. The firms may thus find agreements on higher list prices profitable, even if they continue granting discounts non-cooperatively. Most importantly, for being an equilibrium of the game, such agreements do not require a dynamic game or mutual monitoring of the list prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Paha, Johannes, 2019. "Anchoring, Reference Prices, and List Price Collusion," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203625, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc19:203625
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Haan, Marco A. & Heijnen, Pim & Obradovits, Martin, 2023. "Competition with list prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 502-528.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anchoring; behavioral industrial organization; collusion; list price; loss aversion; reference price;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • M30 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - General

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