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Understanding and managing behavioural risks: the case of malpractice in poultry production

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  • Norbert Hirschauer
  • Stefan Zwoll

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  • Norbert Hirschauer & Stefan Zwoll, 2008. "Understanding and managing behavioural risks: the case of malpractice in poultry production," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 27-60, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:26:y:2008:i:1:p:27-60
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-008-9051-0
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    22. Hirschauer, Norbert & Musshoff, Oliver, 2007. "A game-theoretic approach to behavioral food risks: The case of grain producers," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 246-265, April.
    23. Fehr, Ernst & Gachter, Simon, 1998. "Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 845-859, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mußhoff, Oliver & Hirschauer, Norbert & Hengel, Philipp, 2011. "Sind Unternehmensplanspiele ein geeignetes Instrument zur Analyse begrenzter Rationalität und tatsächlichen Entscheidungsverhaltens?," Journal of International Agricultural Trade and Development, Journal of International Agricultural Trade and Development, vol. 60(3).
    2. Gambelli, Danilo & Solfanelli, Francesco & Zanoli, Raffaele & Zorn, Alexander & Lippert, Christian & Dabbert, Stephan, 2014. "Non-compliance in organic farming: A cross-country comparison of Italy and Germany," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(P2), pages 449-458.
    3. Bimbo, Francesco & Bonanno, Alessandro & Viscecchia, Rosaria, 2019. "An empirical framework to study food labelling fraud: an application to the Italian extra-virgin olive oil market," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 63(4), October.
    4. Miroslava Bavorová & Norbert Hirschauer & Gaetano Martino, 2014. "Food safety and network governance structure of the agri-food system," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 1-11, February.
    5. Müller, Kirsten & Mußhoff, Oliver & Weber, Ron, 2014. "The More the Better? How Collateral Levels Affect Credit Risk in Agricultural Microfinance," Department of Agricultural and Rural Development (DARE) Discussion Papers 260815, Georg-August-Universitaet Goettingen, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development (DARE).
    6. Peth, Denise & Mußhoff, Oliver & Funke, Katja & Hirschauer, Norbert, 2018. "Nudging Farmers to Comply With Water Protection Rules – Experimental Evidence From Germany," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 310-321.
    7. Mußhoff, Oliver & Hirschauer, Norbert & Hengel, Philipp, 2011. "Sind Unternehmensplanspiele ein geeignetes Instrument zur Analyse begrenzter Rationalität und tatsächlichen Entscheidungsverhaltens?," German Journal of Agricultural Economics, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department for Agricultural Economics, vol. 60(03), pages 1-16, August.
    8. Martino, Gaetano & Bavorovà, Miroslava, 2014. "An Analysis of Food Safety Private Investments Drivers in the Italian Meat Sector," 2014 International European Forum, February 17-21, 2014, Innsbruck-Igls, Austria 199366, International European Forum on System Dynamics and Innovation in Food Networks.
    9. Ehmke, Mariah Dolsen & Bonanno, Alessandro & Boys, Kathryn & Smith, Trenton G., 2019. "Food fraud: economic insights into the dark side of incentives," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 63(4), October.
    10. Rommel, J. & Neuenfeldt, S. & Odening, M., 2010. "Markteffekte medienwirksamer Lebensmittelskandale – eine Ergebnisstudie," Proceedings “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.”, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), vol. 45, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric information; Behavioural economic analysis; Control theories; Economic misconduct; Moral hazard; Protective factors; A13; K32; K42;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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