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A game-theoretic approach to behavioral food risks: The case of grain producers

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  • Hirschauer, Norbert
  • Musshoff, Oliver

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  • Hirschauer, Norbert & Musshoff, Oliver, 2007. "A game-theoretic approach to behavioral food risks: The case of grain producers," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 246-265, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfpoli:v:32:y:2007:i:2:p:246-265
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    2. Claude Ménard, 2005. "New institutions for governing the agri-food industry," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 32(3), pages 421-440, September.
    3. Zwoll, Stefan & Hirschauer, Norbert, 2006. "Reduction of Behavioural Food Risks: An Analysis of Economic Incentives and Social Context Factors in the German Poultry Chains," 99th Seminar, February 8-10, 2006, Bonn, Germany 7730, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    4. Olesen, H. B., 2003. "Contract production of peas," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 29-50, February.
    5. Hirschauer, Norbert, 2004. "A model-based approach to moral hazard in food chains - What contribution do principal-agent-models make to the understanding of food risks induced by opportunistic behaviour?," German Journal of Agricultural Economics, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department for Agricultural Economics, vol. 53(05), pages 1-14.
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    20. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martino, Gaetano & Bavorovà, Miroslava, 2014. "An Analysis of Food Safety Private Investments Drivers in the Italian Meat Sector," 2014 International European Forum, February 17-21, 2014, Innsbruck-Igls, Austria 199366, International European Forum on System Dynamics and Innovation in Food Networks.
    2. Liang, Jing & Jensen, Helen H., 2008. "Marketing Agreement, Food Safety and Contract Design," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6434, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    3. Hirschauer, Norbert & Zwoll, Stefan, 2006. "Understanding and Managing Behavioural Risks -The Case of Food Risks Caused by Malpractice in Poultry Production," Working Paper Series 10287, Humboldt University Berlin, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    4. Alexander E. Saak, 2012. "Collective Reputation, Social Norms, and Participation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(3), pages 763-785.
    5. Russo, Carlo & Perito, Maria Angela & Di Fonzo, Antonella, 2014. "Using Private Food Safety Standards to Manage Complexity: A Moral Hazard Perspective," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 15(2), pages 1-15.
    6. Norbert Hirschauer & Stefan Zwoll, 2008. "Understanding and managing behavioural risks: the case of malpractice in poultry production," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 27-60, August.

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