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Optimal choices of fare collection systems for public transportations: Barrier versus barrier-free

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  • Sasaki, Yasuo

Abstract

The present study focuses on two major types of fare collection systems for public transportations, barrier and barrier-free, and provides a mathematical framework to evaluate optimal choices between them, i.e., which system can be more profitable for a transit agency. In particular, we consider game-theoretic interactions between the transit agency and passengers for the barrier-free system and suppose that frequencies of free rides of passengers as well as inspections of the transit agency are given as a Nash equilibrium. Then the optimal choice of fare collection system is described as a subgame perfection solution in an extensive form game. We also conduct a comparative static analysis and examine how each parameter can affect the choice. As an application, we use the framework to explain various choices of fare collection systems in our society depending on local circumstances or transportation types.

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  • Sasaki, Yasuo, 2014. "Optimal choices of fare collection systems for public transportations: Barrier versus barrier-free," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 107-114.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:transb:v:60:y:2014:i:c:p:107-114
    DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2013.12.005
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    1. Benedetto Barabino & Sara Salis, 2019. "Moving Towards a More Accurate Level of Inspection Against Fare Evasion in Proof-of-Payment Transit Systems," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 1319-1346, December.
    2. Ramos, Raúl & Silva, Hugo E., 2023. "Fare evasion in public transport: How does it affect the optimal design and pricing?," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
    3. Barabino, Benedetto & Salis, Sara & Useli, Bruno, 2015. "What are the determinants in making people free riders in proof-of-payment transit systems? Evidence from Italy," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 184-196.
    4. Barabino, Benedetto & Salis, Sara & Useli, Bruno, 2014. "Fare evasion in proof-of-payment transit systems: Deriving the optimum inspection level," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 1-17.
    5. Yang, Zhisen & Yang, Zaili & Yin, Jingbo & Qu, Zhuohua, 2018. "A risk-based game model for rational inspections in port state control," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 477-495.
    6. Guzman, Luis A. & Arellana, Julian & Camargo, José Pablo, 2021. "A hybrid discrete choice model to understand the effect of public policy on fare evasion discouragement in Bogotá's Bus Rapid Transit," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 140-153.
    7. Elmar Wilhelm M. Fürst & David M. Herold, 2018. "Fare Evasion and Ticket Forgery in Public Transport: Insights from Germany, Austria and Switzerland," Societies, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-16, October.
    8. Boyd, Colin, 2020. "Revisiting the foundations of fare evasion research," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 313-324.
    9. Nourinejad, Mehdi & Roorda, Matthew J., 2017. "Parking enforcement policies for commercial vehicles," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 33-50.
    10. Zis, Thalis P.V., 2021. "A game theoretic approach on improving sulphur compliance," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 127-137.
    11. Benedetto Barabino & Sara Salis, 2023. "Segmenting fare-evaders by tandem clustering and logistic regression models," Public Transport, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 61-96, March.
    12. Delbosc, Alexa & Currie, Graham, 2016. "Cluster analysis of fare evasion behaviours in Melbourne, Australia," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 29-36.
    13. Nourinejad, Mehdi & Gandomi, Amir & Roorda, Matthew J., 2020. "Illegal parking and optimal enforcement policies with search friction," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    14. Benedetto Barabino & Cristian Lai & Alessandro Olivo, 2020. "Fare evasion in public transport systems: a review of the literature," Public Transport, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 27-88, March.

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