A Note on the Complementarity of Uniform Emission Standards and Monitoring Strategies
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- Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "A note on the complementarity of uniform emission standards and monitoring strategies," Working Papers 2009/12, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Arguedas, Carmen & Earnhart, Dietrich & Rousseau, Sandra, 2013. "Effluent Limits, Ambient Quality, and Monitoring," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2013/08, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
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More about this item
Keywords
pollution standards; monitoring; non-compliance.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENV-2009-06-17 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2009-06-17 (Law and Economics)
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