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Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play

Author

Listed:
  • Ferreira, J.
  • Gilboa, I.
  • Maschler, M.B.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into account that priorities of the participants may change during the conflict. In this paper we propose an extensive-form game model to handle such situations and suggest and study a solution concept, called credible equilibrium, which generalizes the concept of the Nash equilibrium. We also discuss possible variants to this concept and applications of the model to other types of games.
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Suggested Citation

  • Ferreira, J. & Gilboa, I. & Maschler, M.B., 1992. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play," Discussion Paper 1992-17, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:6da9a264-eb72-486e-92d7-86db6e26fad6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi, 1953. "Welfare Economics of Variable Tastes," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 21(3), pages 204-213.
    2. Charles Blackorby & David Nissen & Daniel Primont & R. Robert Russell, 1973. "Consistent Intertemporal Decision Making," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 40(2), pages 239-248.
    3. Edi Karni & Zvi Safra, 1989. "Dynamic Consistency, Revelations in Auctions and the Structure of Preferences," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(3), pages 421-433.
    4. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    5. Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Machina, Mark J, 1989. "Dynamic Consistency and Non-expected Utility Models of Choice under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 1622-1668, December.
    7. Peter J. Hammond, 1976. "Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 43(1), pages 159-173.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan Shalev, 2000. "Loss aversion equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(2), pages 269-287.
    2. P. Corcho Sánchez & J.L. Ferreira García, 1998. "Credible equilibria in non-finite games and ingames without perfect recall," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 84(0), pages 167-185, December.
    3. SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998. "Loss aversion in repeated games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998014, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Ismael Martinez-Martinez, 2014. "Basic Framework for Games with Quantum-like Players," Working Papers hal-01095472, HAL.
    5. Adam Tauman Kalai & Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 2007. "Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency," Discussion Papers 1444, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Gilboa, Itzhak, 1997. "A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 25-30, July.
    7. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Ismael Martinez-Martinez, 2014. "Basic Framework for Games with Quantum-like Players," PSE Working Papers hal-01095472, HAL.

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