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Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions

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  • Jan Boone
  • Peter Fredriksson
  • Bertil Holmlund
  • Jan C. van Ours
  • Jan C. van Ours

Abstract

This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search e¤ort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs; this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt. The optimal sanction rates implied by our calibrated model are much higher than the sanction rates typically observed in European labor markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Boone & Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund & Jan C. van Ours & Jan C. van Ours, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 616, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_616
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    unemployment insurance; search; sanctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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