Optimal tolls for multi-class traffic: Analytical formulations and policy implications

This paper puts together an analytical formulation to compute optimal tolls for multi-class traffic. The formulation is comprised of two major modules. The first one is an optimization component aimed at computing optimal tolls assuming a Stackelberg game in which the toll agency sets the tolls, and the equilibrating traffic plays the role of the followers. The optimization component is supported by a set of cost models that estimate the externalities as a function of a multivariate vector of traffic flows. These models were estimated using Taylor series expansions of the output obtained from traffic simulations of a hypothetical test case. Of importance to the paper is the total travel time function estimated using this approach that expresses total travel time as a multivariate function of the traffic volumes. The formulation presented in the paper is then applied to a variety of scenarios to gain insight into the optimality of current toll policies. The optimal tolls are computed for two different cases: independent tolls, and tolls proportional to passenger car equivalencies (PCE). The numerical results clearly show that setting tolls proportional to PCEs leads to lower values of welfare that are on average 15% lower than when using independent tolls, though, in some cases the total welfare could be up to 33% lower. This is a consequence of two factors. First, the case of independent tolls has more degrees of freedom than the case of tolls proportional to PCEs. Second, tolls proportional to PCEs do not account for externalities other than congestion, which is likely to lead to lower welfare values. The analytical formulations and numerical results indicate that, because the total travel time is a non-linear function of the traffic volumes, the marginal social costs and thus the optimal congestion tolls also depend on the traffic volumes for each vehicle class. As a result of this, for the relatively low volumes of truck traffic observed in real life, the optimal congestion tolls for trucks could indeed be either lower or about the same as for passenger cars. This stand in sharp contrast with what is implied in the use of PCEs, i.e., that the contribution to congestion are constant. This latter assumption leads to optimal truck congestion tolls that are always proportional to the PCE values. The comparison of the toll ratios (truck tolls divided by passenger car tolls) for both observed and optimal conditions suggests that the tolls for small trucks are about the right level, maybe a slightly lower than optimal. However, the analysis of the toll ratio for large trucks seems to indicate a significant overcharge. The estimates show that the average observed toll ratio for large trucks is even higher than the maximum optimal toll ratio found in the numerical experiments. This suggests that the tolls for large trucks are set on the basis of revenue generation principles while the passenger car tolls are being set based on a mild form of welfare maximization. This leads to a suboptimal cross-subsidization of passenger car traffic in detriment of an important sector of the economy.