The Frequency of Convergent Games under Best-Response Dynamics
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Pangallo, Marco & Farmer, J. Doyne & Heinrich, Torsten, "undated".
"Best reply structure and equilibrium convergence in generic games,"
INET Oxford Working Papers
2017-07, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, revised Mar 2018.
- Marco Pangallo & Torsten Heinrich & J Doyne Farmer, 2017. "Best reply structure and equilibrium convergence in generic games," Papers 1704.05276, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2018.
- William Stanford, 1996. "The Limit Distribution of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Bimatrix Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 21(3), pages 726-733, August.
- Powers, Imelda Yeung, 1990. "Limiting Distributions of the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in N-Person Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(3), pages 277-286.
- Moulin, Herve, 1984. "Dominance solvability and cournot stability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 83-102, February.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Samuel C. Wiese & Torsten Heinrich, 2020. "The Frequency of Convergent Games under Best-Response Dynamics," Papers 2011.01052, arXiv.org.
- Torsten Heinrich & Yoojin Jang & Luca Mungo & Marco Pangallo & Alex Scott & Bassel Tarbush & Samuel Wiese, 2021.
"Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games,"
Papers
2101.04222, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
- Pangallo, Marco & Heinrich, Torsten & Jang, Yoojin & Scott, Alex & Tarbush, Bassel & Wiese, Samuel & Mungo, Luca, 2021. "Best-Response Dynamics, Playing Sequences, And Convergence To Equilibrium In Random Games," INET Oxford Working Papers 2021-02, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
- Ben Amiet & Andrea Collevecchio & Marco Scarsini & Ziwen Zhong, 2021.
"Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 46(4), pages 1552-1572, November.
- Ben Amiet & Andrea Collevecchio & Marco Scarsini & Ziwen Zhong, 2019. "Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games," Papers 1905.10758, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2020.
- Pangallo, Marco & Heinrich, Torsten & Jang, Yoojin & Scott, Alex & Tarbush, Bassel & Wiese, Samuel & Mungo, Luca, 2021. "Best-Response Dynamics, Playing Sequences, And Convergence To Equilibrium In Random Games," INET Oxford Working Papers 2021-23, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
- Samuel C. Wiese & Torsten Heinrich, 2022. "The Frequency of Convergent Games under Best-Response Dynamics," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 689-700, June.
- Klaus Kultti & Hannu Salonen & Hannu Vartiainen, 2011. "Distribution of pure Nash equilibria in n-person games with random best replies," Discussion Papers 71, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Rinott, Yosef & Scarsini, Marco, 2000.
"On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 274-293, November.
- Marco Scarsini & Yosef Rinott, 2000. "On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random games," Post-Print hal-00540207, HAL.
- Stanford, William, 1999. "On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 29-34, January.
- Takahashi, Satoru, 2008. "The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 328-340, May.
- Torsten Heinrich & Yoojin Jang & Luca Mungo & Marco Pangallo & Alex Scott & Bassel Tarbush & Samuel Wiese, 2023. "Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 703-735, September.
- Tom Johnston & Michael Savery & Alex Scott & Bassel Tarbush, 2023. "Game Connectivity and Adaptive Dynamics," Papers 2309.10609, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
- Heifetz, Aviad & Shannon, Chris & Spiegel, Yossi, 2007.
"What to maximize if you must,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 31-57, March.
- Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2003. "What to Maximize If You Must," Game Theory and Information 0303002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- HEIFETZ, Aviad & SHANNON, Chris & SPIEGEL, Yossi, 2003. "What to maximize if you must," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Chris Shannon, 2003. "What to Maximize if You Must," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000044, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2004. "What to Maximize if You Must," Discussion Papers 1414, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- F. Selin Yanikara & Panagiotis Andrianesis & Michael Caramanis, 2020. "Power Markets with Information-Aware Self-scheduling Electric Vehicles," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 930-967, December.
- Stanford, William, 2004. "Individually rational pure strategies in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 221-233, April.
- Desgranges, Gabriel & Gauthier, Stéphane, 2016.
"Rationalizability and efficiency in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 163-176.
- Gabriel Desgranges & Stéphane Gauthier, 2014. "Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14028, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Gabriel Desgranges & Stéphane Gauthier, 2015. "Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01242006, HAL.
- Gabriel Desgranges & Stéphane Gauthier, 2015. "Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly," Post-Print halshs-00975002, HAL.
- Gabriel Desgranges & Stéphane Gauthier, 2015. "Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01242006, HAL.
- Gabriel Desgranges & Stéphane Gauthier, 2015. "Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly," Post-Print hal-01242006, HAL.
- Gabriel Desgranges & Stéphane Gauthier, 2016. "Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly," Post-Print hal-02980111, HAL.
- Gabriel Desgranges & Stéphane Gauthier, 2015. "Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00975002, HAL.
- Gabriel Desgranges & Stéphane Gauthier, 2014. "Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14028r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Oct 2015.
- Pei, Ting & Takahashi, Satoru, 2019. "Rationalizable strategies in random games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 110-125.
- Roger Guesnerie, 2005.
"Strategic Substitutabilities Versus Strategic Complementarities : Towards a General Theory of Expectational Coordination ?,"
Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 115(4), pages 393-412.
- Roger Guesnerie, 2005. "Strategic substitutabilities versus strategic complementarities: Towards a general theory of expectational coordination?," Working Papers halshs-00590856, HAL.
- Roger Guesnerie, 2005. "Strategic Substitutabilities versus Strategic Complemenarities: Towards a General Theory of Expectational Coorination ?," Post-Print halshs-00754064, HAL.
- Roger Guesnerie, 2005. "Strategic substitutabilities versus strategic complementarities: Towards a general theory of expectational coordination?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590856, HAL.
- Andrea Collevecchio & Tuan-Minh Nguyen & Ziwen Zhong, 2024. "Finding pure Nash equilibria in large random games," Papers 2406.09732, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
- Péter Bayer & György Kozics & Nóra Gabriella Szőke, 2020.
"Best-Response Dynamics in Directed Network Games,"
CEU Working Papers
2020_1, Department of Economics, Central European University.
- Kozics, György & Szöke, Nora Gabriella & Bayer, Péter, 2022. "Best-response dynamics in directed network games," TSE Working Papers 22-1290, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Peter Bayer & György Kozics & Nora Gabriella Szöke, 2022. "Best-response dynamics in directed network games," Working Papers hal-03542533, HAL.
- Michael R. Powers & Martin Shubik & Wen Wang, 2016.
"Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
2039, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Michael R. Powers & Martin Shubik & Wen Wang, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2039R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Michael R. Powers & Martin Shubik, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2053, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
More about this item
Keywords
Pure Nash equilibrium; best-response dynamics; random games;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2021-08-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-ISF-2021-08-30 (Islamic Finance)
- NEP-MIC-2021-08-30 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:amz:wpaper:2020-24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: INET Oxford admin team (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inoxfuk.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.