Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes
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- Michael R. Powers & Martin Shubik, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2053, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Michael R. Powers & Martin Shubik & Wen Wang, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2039, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Michael R. Powers & Martin Shubik & Wen Wang, 2016.
"Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
2039, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Michael R. Powers & Martin Shubik, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2053, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Michael R. Powers & Martin Shubik & Wen Wang, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2039R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Powers, Imelda Yeung, 1990. "Limiting Distributions of the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in N-Person Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(3), pages 277-286.
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Cited by:
- Michael R. Powers & Martin Shubik & Wen Wang, 2016.
"Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
2039, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Michael R. Powers & Martin Shubik, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2053, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Michael R. Powers & Martin Shubik & Wen Wang, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2039R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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More about this item
Keywords
2 � 2 matrix games; efficiency; coordination; worth of coordination;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2016-10-30 (Game Theory)
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