IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juipol/v54y2018icp1-10.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Forward contracts in electricity markets and capacity investment: A simulation study

Author

Listed:
  • Álvarez-Uribe, Karla C.
  • Arango-Aramburo, Santiago
  • Larsen, Erik R.

Abstract

This simulation study analyzes the effect of the introduction of forward markets to mitigate cyclical price behavior in electricity markets from a dynamic extended Cobweb model. We pay particular attention to the effect of lags in investment decisions and the effect of not fully replacing retired capacity in electricity markets. In line with previous research, the introduction of forward markets decreases price variability in comparison to a spot market. However, we also observe that lags in investment decisions and the failure to fully replace retired capacity create capacity investments cycles even in the presence a forward market.

Suggested Citation

  • Álvarez-Uribe, Karla C. & Arango-Aramburo, Santiago & Larsen, Erik R., 2018. "Forward contracts in electricity markets and capacity investment: A simulation study," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 1-10.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:54:y:2018:i:c:p:1-10
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2018.07.003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957178716303137
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jup.2018.07.003?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Le Coq, Chloe & Orzen, Henrik, 2006. "Do forward markets enhance competition?: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 415-431, November.
    2. Powell, Andrew, 1993. "Trading Forward in an Imperfect Market: The Case of Electricity in Britain," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(417), pages 444-453, March.
    3. Marc Nerlove, 1958. "Adaptive Expectations and Cobweb Phenomena," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 72(2), pages 227-240.
    4. Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels, 2012. "Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the Power Sector," Papers of Peter Cramton 12cocap, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    5. Anne E. Peck, 1976. "Futures Markets, Supply Response, and Price Stability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(3), pages 407-423.
    6. Anderson, Edward J. & Hu, Xinin & Winchester, Donald, 2007. "Forward contracts in electricity markets: The Australian experience," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 3089-3103, May.
    7. Robert Wilson, 2002. "Architecture of Power Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1299-1340, July.
    8. Figuerola-Ferretti, Isabel & Gonzalo, Jesús, 2010. "Modelling and measuring price discovery in commodity markets," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 158(1), pages 95-107, September.
    9. Dominique Finon & Virginie Pignon, 2008. "Electricity and long-term capacity adequacy: The quest for regulatory mechanism compatible with electricity market," Post-Print hal-00716312, HAL.
    10. Frank Wolak, 2000. "An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Hedge Contracts on Bidding Behavior in a Competitive Electricity Market," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(2), pages 1-39.
    11. repec:bla:jindec:v:47:y:1999:i:1:p:107-24 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Rassenti, Stephen & Reynolds, Stanley S. & Smith, Vernon L. & Szidarovszky, Ferenc, 2000. "Adaptation and convergence of behavior in repeated experimental Cournot games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 117-146, February.
    13. Olsina, Fernando & Garces, Francisco & Haubrich, H.-J., 2006. "Modeling long-term dynamics of electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(12), pages 1411-1433, August.
    14. Ausubel, Lawrence M. & Cramton, Peter, 2010. "Using forward markets to improve electricity market design," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 195-200, December.
    15. Ford, Andrew, 1999. "Cycles in competitive electricity markets: a simulation study of the western United States," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(11), pages 637-658, October.
    16. David M. Newbery, 1998. "Competition, Contracts, and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 726-749, Winter.
    17. Finon, Dominique & Pignon, Virginie, 2008. "Electricity and long-term capacity adequacy: The quest for regulatory mechanism compatible with electricity market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 143-158, September.
    18. Margaret E. Slade & Henry Thille, 2006. "Commodity Spot Prices: An Exploratory Assessment of Market Structure and Forward‐Trading Effects," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 73(290), pages 229-256, May.
    19. Lomi, Alessandro & Larsen, Erik, 1999. "Learning without experience: strategic implications of deregulation and competition in the electricity industry," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 151-163, April.
    20. E R Larsen & D W Bunn, 1999. "Deregulation in electricity: understanding strategic and regulatory risk," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 50(4), pages 337-344, April.
    21. Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Jörg Oechssler, 2002. "Stability of the Cournot process - experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 31(1), pages 123-136.
    22. Richard Green, 1999. "The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 107-124, March.
    23. Edward J. Anderson & Xinmin Hu, 2012. "Asymmetric Supply Function Equilibria with Forward Contracts," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 198-224, January.
    24. Arango, Santiago & Larsen, Erik, 2011. "Cycles in deregulated electricity markets: Empirical evidence from two decades," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 2457-2466, May.
    25. Arango, Santiago & Castañeda, Jaime A. & Larsen, Erik R., 2013. "Mothballing in power markets: An experimental study," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 125-134.
    26. Hendrik Bessembinder & Michael L. Lemmon, 2002. "Equilibrium Pricing and Optimal Hedging in Electricity Forward Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1347-1382, June.
    27. John D. Sterman, 1989. "Modeling Managerial Behavior: Misperceptions of Feedback in a Dynamic Decision Making Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(3), pages 321-339, March.
    28. Stein, Jerome L, 1992. "Cobwebs, Rational Expectations and Futures Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(1), pages 127-134, February.
    29. Danthine, Jean-Pierre, 1978. "Information, futures prices, and stabilizing speculation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 79-98, February.
    30. Mordecai Ezekiel, 1938. "The Cobweb Theorem," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 52(2), pages 255-280.
    31. Pär Holmberg, 2011. "Strategic Forward Contracting in the Wholesale Electricity Market," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 169-202.
    32. Bunn, Derek W. & Larsen, Erik R., 1992. "Sensitivity of reserve margin to factors influencing investment behaviour in the electricity market of England and Wales," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 420-429, May.
    33. Sterman, John D., 1989. "Misperceptions of feedback in dynamic decision making," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 301-335, June.
    34. Arango, Santiago & Moxnes, Erling, 2012. "Commodity cycles, a function of market complexity? Extending the cobweb experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 321-334.
    35. Blaise Allaz & Jean-Luc Vila, 1993. "Cournot Competition, Forward Markets and Efficiency," Post-Print hal-00511806, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tao, Zhenmin & Moncada, Jorge Andres & Delarue, Erik, 2023. "Exploring the impact of boundedly rational power plant investment decision-making by applying prospect theory," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    2. Arango-Aramburo, Santiago & Bernal-García, Sebastián & Larsen, Erik R., 2021. "Renewable energy sources and the cycles in deregulated electricity markets," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 223(C).
    3. Rios-Festner, Daniel & Blanco, Gerardo & Olsina, Fernando, 2020. "Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    4. Arias-Gaviria, Jessica & Arango-Aramburo, Santiago & Lamadrid L, Alberto J., 2022. "The effects of high penetrations of renewable energy sources in cycles for electricity markets: An experimental analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Arango, Santiago & Castañeda, Jaime A. & Larsen, Erik R., 2013. "Mothballing in power markets: An experimental study," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 125-134.
    2. Holmberg, Pär & Willems, Bert, 2015. "Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 236-266.
    3. Arango, Santiago & Larsen, Erik, 2011. "Cycles in deregulated electricity markets: Empirical evidence from two decades," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 2457-2466, May.
    4. Arango-Aramburo, Santiago & Bernal-García, Sebastián & Larsen, Erik R., 2021. "Renewable energy sources and the cycles in deregulated electricity markets," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 223(C).
    5. Dressler, Luisa, 2016. "Support schemes for renewable electricity in the European Union: Producer strategies and competition," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 186-196.
    6. Remco van Eijkel & Jose Luis Moraga, 2010. "Do Firms sell forward for Strategic Reasons? An Application to the Wholesale Market for Natural Gas," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-058/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Arias-Gaviria, Jessica & Arango-Aramburo, Santiago & Lamadrid L, Alberto J., 2022. "The effects of high penetrations of renewable energy sources in cycles for electricity markets: An experimental analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    8. Arango, Santiago & Moxnes, Erling, 2012. "Commodity cycles, a function of market complexity? Extending the cobweb experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 321-334.
    9. David P. Brown & Andrew Eckert, 2018. "Analyzing the Impact of Electricity Market Structure Changes and Mergers: The Importance of Forward Commitments," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(1), pages 101-137, February.
    10. Simshauser, P., 2020. "Merchant utilities and boundaries of the firm: vertical integration in energy-only markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2039, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    11. van Eijkel, Remco & Kuper, Gerard H. & Moraga-González, José L., 2016. "Do firms sell forward for strategic reasons? An application to the wholesale market for natural gas," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 1-35.
    12. Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis‐Christou & Arthur Schram, 2008. "Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 192-214, January.
    13. Anderson, Edward J. & Hu, Xinmin, 2008. "Forward contracts and market power in an electricity market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 679-694, May.
    14. Holmberg, Pär & Tangerås, Thomas & Ahlqvist, Victor, 2018. "Central- versus Self-Dispatch in Electricity Markets," Working Paper Series 1257, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 27 Mar 2019.
    15. David P. Brown & David E. M. Sappington, 2023. "Employing gain-sharing regulation to promote forward contracting in the electricity sector," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 30-56, April.
    16. Van Moer, Geert, 2019. "Electricity market competition when forward contracts are pairwise efficient," MPRA Paper 96660, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. David P. Brown & David E. M. Sappington, 2023. "Load-Following Forward Contracts," The Energy Journal, , vol. 44(3), pages 187-222, May.
    18. Gencer, Busra & Larsen, Erik Reimer & van Ackere, Ann, 2020. "Understanding the coevolution of electricity markets and regulation," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    19. Baldursson , Fridrik M. & von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts in Risky Markets," Memorandum 01/2007, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    20. de Bragança, Gabriel Godofredo Fiuza & Daglish, Toby, 2017. "Investing in vertical integration: electricity retail market participation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 355-365.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:54:y:2018:i:c:p:1-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/utilities-policy .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.