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Probabilities of Preferences and Cycles with Super Majority Rules

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  • Tovey, Craig A.

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  • Tovey, Craig A., 1997. "Probabilities of Preferences and Cycles with Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 271-279, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:75:y:1997:i:2:p:271-279
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-636, May.
    2. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
    3. Balasko, Yves & Cres, Herve, 1997. "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 237-270, August.
    4. Schofield, N. & Tovey, C.A., 1992. "Probability and Convergence for Supramajority rule with Euclidean Preferences," Papers 163, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cres, Herve & Tvede, Mich, 2001. "Ordering Pareto-optima through majority voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 295-325, May.
    2. Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2016. "Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(3), pages 473-494, March.
    3. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/10286 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2016. "Probabilities of Consistent Election Outcomes with Majorities Based on Difference in Support," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(5), pages 967-994, September.
    5. Hervé Crès, 2001. "Aggregation of coarse preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 507-525.
    6. Hervé Crès, 2000. "Aggregation of Coarse Preferences," SciencePo Working papers hal-01064879, HAL.
    7. Ram Sewak Dubey & Giorgio Laguzzi, 2022. "How rare are the properties of binary relations?," Papers 2202.05229, arXiv.org.
    8. Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2015. "Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes," Working Papers halshs-01241996, HAL.
    9. Dougherty, Keith L. & Heckelman, Jac C., 2020. "The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    10. Stensholt, Eivind, 1999. "Beta distributions in a simplex and impartial anonymous cultures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 45-57, January.
    11. Diss, Mostapha & Dougherty, Keith & Heckelman, Jac C., 2023. "When ties are possible: Weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 128-136.
    12. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/10286 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/10286 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Hervé Crès, 2000. "Aggregation of Coarse Preferences," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01064879, HAL.
    15. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/10286 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.

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