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On 64%-Majority Rule

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  • Caplin, Andrew S
  • Nalebuff, Barry J

Abstract

Many electoral rules require a super-majority vote to change the status quo. Without some restriction on preferences, super-majority rules have paradoxical properties. For example, electoral cycles are possible with anything other than 100 percent majority rule. The auth ors show that these problems do not arise if there is sufficient simi larity of attitudes among the voting population. Their definition of social consensus involves two restrictions on domain: one on individu al preferences, the other on the distribution of preferences. When th is consensus exists, 64 percent majority rule has many desirable prop erties, including the elimination of all electoral cycles. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:56:y:1988:i:4:p:787-814
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