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Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem

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  • Caplin, Andrew
  • Nalebuff, Barry

Abstract

A celebrated result of D. Black (1948) demonstrates the existence of a simple-majority winner when preferences are single-peaked. This paper provides a multidimensional analog of Black's median voter result. The authors provide conditions under which the mean voter's most preferred outcome is unbeatable according to a 64 percent majority rule. The conditions supporting this result represent a significant generalization of A. Caplin and B. Nalebuff (1988). The shift from median voter to mean voter requires a new mathematical approach; the authors introduce to economics a mathematical aggregation theorem due to A. Pr$8Ekopa (1971) and C. Borell (1975). Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:1:p:1-23
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-330, March.
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    7. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
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