Majority voting with stochastic preferences: the whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2006. "Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 207-216, September.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2006. "Majority voting with stochastic preferences: the whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8364, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2004. "Majority voting with stochastic preferences : The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2004-07, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
References listed on IDEAS
- Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-636, May.
- Matsen, Egil & Roisland, Oistein, 2005.
"Interest rate decisions in an asymmetric monetary union,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 365-384, June.
- Egil Matsen & Øistein Røisland, 2003. "Interest Rate Decisions in an Asymmetric Monetary Union," Working Paper Series 2803, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991.
"Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January.
- Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff, 1990. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 938, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- McKelvey, Richard D. & Schofield, Norman, 1986.
"Structural instability of the core,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 179-198, June.
- McKelvey, R. D. & Schofield, N., 1984. "Structural Instability of the Core," Working Papers 535, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Banks, Jeffrey S., 1995. "Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 523-536.
- Schofield, Norman, 2002. "Representative democracy as social choice," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 425-455, Elsevier.
- Popkin, Samuel & Gorman, John W. & Phillips, Charles & Smith, Jeffrey A., 1976. "Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 779-805, September.
- Sapir, Andre & Sekkat, Khalid, 1999.
"Optimum electoral areas: Should Europe adopt a single election day?,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 1595-1619, August.
- André Sapir & Khalid Sekkat, 1999. "Optimum electoral areas: should Europe adopt a single election day?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7336, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
- Norman Schofield, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(3), pages 575-594.
- Schofield, Norman, 1977. "Transitivity of preferences on a smooth manifold of alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 149-171, February.
- McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
- McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1985. "Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 55-85, June.
- Schofield, N. & Tovey, C.A., 1992. "Probability and Convergence for Supramajority rule with Euclidean Preferences," Papers 163, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
- McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
- Davis, Otto A & DeGroot, Morris H & Hinich, Melvin J, 1972. "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(1), pages 147-157, January.
- Slutsky, Steven, 1977. "A voting model for the allocation of public goods: Existence of an equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 299-325, April.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Bernal, Oscar & Oosterlinck, Kim & Szafarz, Ariane, 2010.
"Observing bailout expectations during a total eclipse of the sun,"
Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1193-1205, November.
- Oscar Bernal Diaz & Kim Oosterlinck & Ariane Szafarz, 2008. "Observing bailout expectations during a total eclipse of the sun," Working Papers CEB 08-015.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Oscar Bernal Diaz & Kim Oosterlinck & Ariane Szafarz, 2009. "Observing bailout expectations during a total eclipse of the sun," DULBEA Working Papers 09-01.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Charles Plaigin, 2009. "Exploratory study on the presence of cultural and institutional growth spillovers," DULBEA Working Papers 09-03.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008.
"Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 817-832, December.
- Mr. Helge Berger & Mr. Tonny Lybek & Volker Nitsch, 2006. "Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?," IMF Working Papers 2006/281, International Monetary Fund.
- Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central Bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?," Discussion Papers 2008/5, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch & Tonny Lybek, 2007. "Central Bank Boards around the World: Why does Membership Size Differ?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1897, CESifo.
- Nitsch, Volker & Berger, Helge & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central Bank Boards around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 34446, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Ariane Szafarz, 2008.
"Labor market discrimination as an agency cost,"
DULBEA Working Papers
08-19.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Ariane Szafarz, 2008. "Labour market discrimination as an agency cost," Working Papers CEB 08-019.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Farvaque, Etienne & Matsueda, Norimichi & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2009.
"How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates,"
Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 534-546, December.
- Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2008. "How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates," Working Papers CEB 08-026.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Caroline Gerschlager, 2008. "Foolishness and identity: Amartya Sen and Adam Smith," DULBEA Working Papers 08-03.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 88-101, January.
- Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001.
"Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent,"
Working Papers
hal-01065004, HAL.
- CRES, Herve & TVEDE, Mich, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," HEC Research Papers Series 726, HEC Paris.
- Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Working Papers hal-00597200, HAL.
- Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "The instability of instability of centered distributions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 53-73, January.
- repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hervé Crès & M. Utku Ünver, 2010.
"Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models,"
Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(4), pages 431-444, October.
- Hervé Crès & Utku Ünver, 2005. "Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models," Post-Print halshs-00006729, HAL.
- Hervé Crès & Utku Unver, 2010. "Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models," Post-Print hal-01023800, HAL.
- Hervé Crès & M. Utku Ünver, 2008. "Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 716, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Hervé Crès & Utku Unver, 2005. "Ideology and existence of 50% : Majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01065582, HAL.
- Crès, Hervé & Ünver, Utku, 2006. "Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models," HEC Research Papers Series 818, HEC Paris.
- Hervé Crès & Utku Unver, 2005. "Ideology and existence of 50% : Majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models," Working Papers hal-01065582, HAL.
- Herve Cres & M. Utku Unver, 2005. "Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models," Microeconomics 0506007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hervé Crès & Utku Unver, 2010. "Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01023800, HAL.
- Daniel E. Ingberman & Robert P. Inman, 1987. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy," NBER Working Papers 2405, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- De Donder, Philippe & Gallego, Maria, 2017. "Electoral Competition and Party Positioning," TSE Working Papers 17-760, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Crès, Hervé & Utku Ünver, M., 2017. "Toward a 50%-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 145-149.
- Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01065004, HAL.
- Edward Wesep, 2012. "Defensive Politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 425-444, June.
- Josep M. Colomer, 1999. "On the Geometry of Unanimity Rule," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(4), pages 543-553, October.
- Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," SciencePo Working papers hal-01065004, HAL.
- Norman Schofield, 1986. "Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 267-284, January.
- A. J. McGann, 2004. "The Tyranny of the Supermajority," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(1), pages 53-77, January.
- Jacob Bower-Bir & William Bianco & Nicholas D’Amico & Christopher Kam & Itai Sened & Regina Smyth, 2015. "Predicting majority rule: Evaluating the uncovered set and the strong point," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 650-672, October.
- Thomas Bräuninger, 2007. "Stability in Spatial Voting Games with Restricted Preference Maximizing," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(2), pages 173-191, April.
- Nicholas R. Miller, 2015. "The spatial model of social choice and voting," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 10, pages 163-181, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Tanner, Thomas Cole, 1994. "The spatial theory of elections: an analysis of voters' predictive dimensions and recovery of the underlying issue space," ISU General Staff Papers 1994010108000018174, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Norman Schofield, 2015. "Climate Change, Collapse and Social Choice Theory," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 007-035, October.
- Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 3-19, March.
- B. D. Bernheim & S. N. Slavov, 2009.
"A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(1), pages 33-62.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Sita Nataraj Slavov, 2007. "A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings," Discussion Papers 07-029, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
More about this item
Keywords
committee; majority voting; uncertainty; volatility;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBA-2006-05-20 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CDM-2006-05-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2006-05-20 (Positive Political Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dul:wpaper:06-05rs. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Benoit Pauwels (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dulbebe.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.