Fiscal Constitutions
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- Hans Gersbach, 2004. "Fiscal Constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 3-25, March.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Gersbach, Hans, 1992. "Allocation of information by majority decisions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 259-268, July.
- Rae, Douglas W., 1969. "Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 40-56, March.
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Cited by:
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- Dieter Bös & Martin Kolmar, 2000. "Anarchy, Efficiency, and Redistribution," CESifo Working Paper Series 357, CESifo.
- Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn & Stephan Imhof, 2013.
"Tax rules,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 19-42, June.
- Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker & Imhof, Stephan, 2010. "Tax Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 7831, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Keywords
Incomplete social contracts; constitutions; treatment rules; majority rules;All these keywords.
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