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Ordering Pareto-Optima Through Majority Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Hervé Crès

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Mich Tvede

    (Department of Economics [Copenhagen] - Faculty of Social Sciences [Copenhagen] - UCPH - University of Copenhagen = Københavns Universitet)

Abstract

A commodity is shared between some individuals; some selection procedure is used to choose allocations. In order to reflect that laws and rules rather than allocations are implemented and that they involve an element of randomness because of incomplete information, selection procedures are taken to be probability measures over the set of allocations. Illustrations and interpretations of the selection procedures are given.

Suggested Citation

  • Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 1998. "Ordering Pareto-Optima Through Majority Voting," Working Papers hal-00601583, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00601583
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Cass, David & Shell, Karl, 1983. "Do Sunspots Matter?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(2), pages 193-227, April.
    3. Sven Berg, 1985. "Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 377-387, January.
    4. Tovey, Craig A., 1997. "Probabilities of Preferences and Cycles with Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 271-279, August.
    5. Balasko, Yves, 1990. "Equivariant general equilibrium theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 18-44, October.
    6. Cres, Herve, 1996. "Symmetric Smooth Consumption Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 334-366, May.
    7. Malinvaud, E, 1973. "Markets for an Exchange Economy with Individual Risks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(3), pages 383-410, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/10284 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/10284 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Hervé Crès, 2000. "Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01064883, HAL.
    4. CRES, Herve, 2000. "Majority stable production equilibria : a multivariate mean shareholders theorem," HEC Research Papers Series 706, HEC Paris.
    5. Cres, Herve & Rossi, Isabelle, 2000. "Symmetry breakings in Malinvaud's model with individual risks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 239-269, March.
    6. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/10284 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Hervé Crès, 2000. "Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem," SciencePo Working papers hal-01064883, HAL.
    8. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/10284 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pareto-optimal allocations; infra-majority voting;

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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