IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/theord/v53y2002i2p153-186.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Regenwetter
  • James Adams
  • Bernard Grofman

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:53:y:2002:i:2:p:153-186
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1021215903030
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1021215903030
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1023/A:1021215903030?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1976. "Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, June.
    2. Feld, Scott L. & Grofman, Bernard, 1988. "Ideological Consistency as a Collective Phenomenon," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(3), pages 773-788, September.
    3. van Deemen, Adrian M A & Vergunst, Noel P, 1998. "Empirical Evidence of Paradoxes of Voting in Dutch Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 475-490, December.
    4. Kuga, Kiyoshi & Nagatani, Hiroaki, 1974. "Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(6), pages 1045-1067, November.
    5. Norman Schofield, 1995. "Coalition Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 245-281, July.
    6. James F. Adams & Ernest W. Adams, 2000. "The Geometry of Voting Cycles," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(2), pages 131-153, April.
    7. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 2001. "The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 39-50, January.
    8. Feld, Scott L. & Grofman, Bernard, 1986. "On the Possibility of Faithfully Representative Committees," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(3), pages 863-879, September.
    9. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/10273 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. John Dobra & Gordon Tullock, 1981. "An approach to empirical measures of voting paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 193-194, January.
    11. Sen, Amartya & Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1969. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 178-202, August.
    12. Balasko, Yves & Cres, Herve, 1997. "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 237-270, August.
    13. Riker, William H., 1958. "The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 349-366, June.
    14. Schofield, Norman & Grofman, Bernard & Feld, Scott L., 1988. "The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(1), pages 195-211, March.
    15. Brady, Henry E. & Ansolabehere, Stephen, 1989. "The Nature of Utility Functions in Mass Publics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 143-163, March.
    16. Scott L. Feld & Bernard Grofman, 1990. "Collectivities as Actors," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(4), pages 429-448, October.
    17. Nicholas R. Miller & Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld, 1989. "The Geometry of Majority Rule," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 1(4), pages 379-406, October.
    18. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 1999. "Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(3), pages 471-490.
    19. Norman Schofield, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705.
    20. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    21. Tovey, Craig A., 1997. "Probabilities of Preferences and Cycles with Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 271-279, August.
    22. Niemi, Richard G., 1969. "Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 488-497, June.
    23. Klahr, David, 1966. "A Computer Simulation of the Paradox of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(2), pages 384-390, June.
    24. Yves Balasko & Hervé Crès, 1997. "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super-Majority Rules," Post-Print hal-03458336, HAL.
    25. Richard Niemi, 1983. "Why so much stability?: Another opinion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 261-270, January.
    26. Jones, Bradford & Radcliff, Benjamin & Taber, Charles & Timpone, Richard, 1995. "Condorcet Winners and the Paradox of Voting: Probability Calculations for Weak Preference Orders," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(1), pages 137-144, March.
    27. Fabrice Valognes & William V. Gehrlein, 2001. "Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 193-205.
    28. Cohen, Linda, 1979. "Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-12, February.
    29. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    30. Richard Niemi, 1970. "The occurrence of the paradox of voting in University elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 91-100, March.
    31. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
    32. Bernard Grofman & Michel Regenwetter, 1998. "Choosing subsets: a size-independent probabilistic model and the quest for a social welfare ordering," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 423-443.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lachat, Romain & Laslier, Jean-François, 2024. "Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    2. Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
    3. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2020. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Post-Print hal-02424936, HAL.
    4. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2005. "The Possibility of a Preference-Based Power Index," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 17(3), pages 377-387, July.
    5. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2018. "Trump, Condorcet and Borda: Voting paradoxes in the 2016 Republican presidential primaries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 29-35.
    6. James F. Adams, 2015. "Competing for votes," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 12, pages 201-217, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Working Papers hal-02424936, HAL.
    8. Regenwetter, Michel & Marley, A. A. J. & Grofman, Bernard, 2002. "A general concept of majority rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 405-428, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Adrian Deemen, 2014. "On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 311-330, March.
    2. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Working Papers hal-02424936, HAL.
    3. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2001. "An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 135-145, April.
    4. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2014. "Empirical social choice: an introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 297-310, March.
    5. Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2016. "Probabilities of Consistent Election Outcomes with Majorities Based on Difference in Support," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(5), pages 967-994, September.
    6. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman, 1986. "Research note Partial single-peakedness: An extension and clarification," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 71-80, January.
    7. Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
    8. William Gehrlein, 2002. "Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences ," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 171-199, March.
    9. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2002. "Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 88-105, March.
    10. Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 88-101, January.
    11. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman & Nicholas Miller, 1988. "Centripetal forces in spatial voting: On the size of the Yolk," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 37-50, October.
    12. Itai Sened, 1991. "Contemporary Theory of Institutions in Perspective," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(4), pages 379-402, October.
    13. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Working Papers hal-01065004, HAL.
    14. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    15. Norman Schofield, 1986. "Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 267-284, January.
    16. Kalandrakis, Anastassios, 2004. "A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 294-322, June.
    17. A. J. McGann, 2004. "The Tyranny of the Supermajority," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(1), pages 53-77, January.
    18. Cesar Garcia Perez de Leon, 2012. "Does implicit voting matter? Coalitional bargaining in the EU legislative process," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(4), pages 513-534, December.
    19. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2010. "The Condorcet Paradox Revisited," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-026/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    20. Regenwetter, Michel & Marley, A. A. J. & Grofman, Bernard, 2002. "A general concept of majority rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 405-428, July.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:53:y:2002:i:2:p:153-186. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.