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Believe me, I am ignorant, but not biased

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  • Foerster, Manuel
  • Voss, Achim

Abstract

In our political-agency setting, voters are uninformed about two traits of an incumbent politician: ability and bias. Voters observe the implemented policy and learn the state immediately before the election. We show that when the bias of biased politicians is strong such that voters prefer neutral politicians even if they have low ability, high-ability and biased politicians may secure re-election by appearing ignorant. Furthermore, we introduce a news shock that may reveal the state earlier, when a policy change is still possible. Raising the likelihood of a shock may decrease voter welfare if bias is very strong.

Suggested Citation

  • Foerster, Manuel & Voss, Achim, 2022. "Believe me, I am ignorant, but not biased," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:149:y:2022:i:c:s0014292122001544
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104262
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    Cited by:

    1. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A., 2023. "Reputation and perverse transparency under two concerns," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political agency; Asymmetric information; Signaling; Elections; Ignorance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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