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Contribution and bribe: lobbying in presence of incumbent and bureaucrat

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  • Marco Catola

Abstract

This paper discusses the effects on the quality of the decision of the introduction of a watchdog bureaucrat who provides policy recommendations that are costly to be ignored. Through a simple model, it is shown that, if both the politician and the bureaucrat are sensitive to the pressure of an interest group, the positive impact of bureaucrats is very small, even though not null. Moreover, by characterising the conditions that allow this effect, it is shown that if the bureaucrat's recommendation is too binding, the decision power moves from the politician to the bureaucrat, producing a reduction in accountability without any improvement in the quality of the decision.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Catola, 2019. "Contribution and bribe: lobbying in presence of incumbent and bureaucrat," Discussion Papers 2019/247, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:pie:dsedps:2019/247
    Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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    File URL: https://www.ec.unipi.it/documents/Ricerca/papers/2019-247.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    lobbying; interest group; decision making process; bureaucracy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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