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Covert learning and disclosure

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  • Matteo Escud'e

Abstract

I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport her findings is limited. In equilibrium, the sender only influences the receiver by choosing to remain selectively ignorant, rather than by deceiving her about the discoveries. Although deception does not occur, I highlight how deception possibilities determine what information the sender chooses to acquire and transmit. I then turn to comparative statics, characterizing in which sense the sender benefits from her claims being more verifiable, showing this is akin to increasing her commitment power. Finally, I characterize sender- and receiver-optimal falsification environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Matteo Escud'e, 2023. "Covert learning and disclosure," Papers 2304.02989, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2304.02989
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