IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/exehis/v45y2008i4p303-326.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Wage strikes in 1880s America: A test of the war of attrition model

Author

Listed:
  • Geraghty, Thomas M.
  • Wiseman, Thomas

Abstract

By relating strike outcomes and durations to the value of the disputed wage change and to the cost to each side of continuing the strike, this paper tests the hypothesis that the war of attrition with asymmetric information model of strikes accurately describes the characteristics of strikes over wages in the United States in the early to middle part of the 1880s. That hypothesis is not rejected by linear, probit, or nonparametric kernel estimation. Specifically, variables that decrease a side's cost of striking or increase its opponent's cost are shown to increase its maximum holdout time, and vice versa, and strike duration increases with the value of the prize in dispute and with uncertainty about the outcome. Alternative game theoretic models of strikes--signaling and screening models, and models with ongoing negotiations--do not fit the data as well. We also explore why the strikes took the form of wars of attrition, and why later strikes did not. Our results have implications for modern union behavior in the face of globalization.

Suggested Citation

  • Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Wage strikes in 1880s America: A test of the war of attrition model," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 303-326, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:45:y:2008:i:4:p:303-326
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014-4983(07)00056-3
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bac, Mehmet, 1996. "Incomplete Information and Incentives to Free Ride on International Environmental Resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 301-315, May.
    2. Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Thomas Kochan, 2004. "Taking Stock: Collective Bargaining at the Turn of the Century," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 58(1), pages 3-26, October.
    3. Bilodeau, Marc & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "Toilet cleaning and department chairing: Volunteering a public service," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 299-308, February.
    4. Amann, Erwin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1996. "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, May.
    5. Michael D. Bordo & Claudia Goldin & Eugene N. White, 1998. "The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number bord98-1, February.
    6. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages 87-130, Supplemen.
    7. Card, David & Olson, Craig A, 1995. "Bargaining Power, Strike Durations, and Wage Outcomes: An Analysis of Strikes in the 1880s," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 32-61, January.
    8. Mehmet Bac, 1996. "Incomplete information and incentives to free ride," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(4), pages 419-432.
    9. George E. Barnett, 1912. "National and District Systems of Collective Bargaining in the United States," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 26(3), pages 425-443.
    10. Richard B. Freeman, 1998. "Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes," NBER Chapters, in: The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century, pages 265-296, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Rosenbloom, Joshua L., 1998. "Strikebreaking and the Labor Market in the United States, 1881–1894," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 183-205, March.
    12. Robert A. Margo, 1992. "The Labor Force in the Nineteenth Century," NBER Historical Working Papers 0040, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-960, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Molinder, Jakob & Karlsson, Tobias & Enflo, Kerstin, 2022. "Social democracy and the decline of strikes," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    2. Kerstin Enflo & Tobias Karlsson, 2019. "From conflict to compromise: the importance of mediation in Swedish work stoppages 1907–1927," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 23(3), pages 268-298.
    3. Stefan Oliver Houpt & Juan Carlos Rojo Cagigal, 2014. "Relative deprivation and labour conflict during Spain’s industrialization: the Bilbao estuary, 1914–1936," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 8(3), pages 335-369, September.
    4. Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2022. "Engaging in Wars of Attrition," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 147, pages 79-100.
    5. Kyung nok Chun & Zachary Schaller & Stergios Skaperdas, 2020. "Why Are There Strikes?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 929-956.
    6. Archontis L. Pantsios & Solomon W. Polachek, 2017. "How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 45(2), pages 149-161, June.
    7. Michele Campolieti, 2021. "Strikes in British Coal Mining, 1893–1940: Testing Models of Strikes," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 243-273, April.
    8. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Conflict and compromise: Changes in U.S. strike outcomes, 1880 to 1945," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 519-537.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Florian Morath, 2013. "Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 99-131, June.
    2. Hannah Hörisch & Oliver Kirchkamp, 2010. "Less fighting than expected," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 347-367, July.
    3. David P. Myatt, 2005. "Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 160, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Michael Huberman & Denise Young, 2000. "Hope against Hope: Persistent Canadian Unions in the Interwar Years," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-28, CIRANO.
    5. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Conflict and compromise: Changes in U.S. strike outcomes, 1880 to 1945," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 519-537.
    6. Huberman, Michael & Young, Denise, 2002. "Hope against Hope: Strike Activity in Canada, 1920-1939," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 315-354, July.
    7. Molinder, Jakob & Karlsson, Tobias & Enflo, Kerstin, 2022. "Social democracy and the decline of strikes," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    8. Kim Geofferey Jiyun & Kim Bara, 2018. "Symmetric Equilibria in a Cost-Averting War of Attrition Requiring Minimum Necessary Conceders," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-9, January.
    9. Michael Kremer & Benjamin A. Olken, 2009. "A Biological Model of Unions," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 150-175, April.
    10. Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2021. "Overconfidence and conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(4), pages 1483-1499, October.
    11. Silviano Esteve Pérez & Mariluz Marco Aledo & María Engracia Rochina Barrachina, 2006. "A Competing Risks Analysis of Strike Duration in Spain: Agreement and Non-Agreement Outcomes," Revista de Economía Laboral - Spanish Journal of Labour Economics, Asociación Española de Economía Laboral - AEET, vol. 3, pages 14-45.
    12. David Card & Richard B. Freeman, 2004. "What Have Two Decades of British Economic Reform Delivered?," NBER Chapters, in: Seeking a Premier Economy: The Economic Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980–2000, pages 9-62, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Félix Muñoz-García, 2011. "Free-riding in international environmental agreements: A signaling approach to non-enforceable treaties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(1), pages 111-134, January.
    14. Card, David & Olson, Craig A, 1995. "Bargaining Power, Strike Durations, and Wage Outcomes: An Analysis of Strikes in the 1880s," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 32-61, January.
    15. Enflo, Kerstin & Molinder, Jakob & Karlsson, Tobias, 2018. "The Power Resource Theory Revisited: What Explains the Decline in Industrial Conflicts in Sweden?," CEPR Discussion Papers 13130, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Sidartha Gordon & Emeric Henry & Pauli Murto, 2021. "Waiting for my neighbors," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(2), pages 251-282, June.
    17. Bingchao Huangfu & Gagan Ghosh & Heng Liu, 2023. "Resource inequality in the war of attrition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 33-61, March.
    18. Campolieti, Michele, 2020. "The distribution of union size: Canada, 1913–2014," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 558(C).
    19. Laraki, Rida & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2005. "Continuous-time games of timing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 206-238, February.
    20. Kyung nok Chun & Zachary Schaller & Stergios Skaperdas, 2020. "Why Are There Strikes?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 929-956.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:45:y:2008:i:4:p:303-326. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622830 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.