Engaging in Wars of Attrition
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/48684787
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Other versions of this item:
- Maxime Menuet & Petros G Sekeris, 2022. "Engaging In Wars Of Attrition," Post-Print hal-03810175, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Antonis Adam & Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2024. "Conflict under the shadow of elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 173-199, July.
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More about this item
Keywords
War of Attrition; Conflict Initiation; Non-cooperative Game;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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