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Decentralized task coordination

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  • Gudmundsson, Jens
  • Hougaard, Jens Leth
  • Platz, Trine Tornøe

Abstract

We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized two-stage mechanisms, in which agents first announce preferred individual workloads and then bargain over the induced joint cost savings. The second-stage negotiations depend on the first-stage announcements as specified through the mechanism’s recognition function. We characterize mechanisms that incentivize cost-effective task allocation and further single out a particular mechanism, which additionally ensures a fair distribution of the system-wide cost savings.

Suggested Citation

  • Gudmundsson, Jens & Hougaard, Jens Leth & Platz, Trine Tornøe, 2023. "Decentralized task coordination," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 304(2), pages 851-864.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:304:y:2023:i:2:p:851-864
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.04.026
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; Decentralized mechanisms; Implementation; Bargaining; Consistency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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