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Combining leximax fairness and efficiency in a mathematical programming model

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  • Chen, Violet Xinying
  • Hooker, J.N.

Abstract

A trade-off between fairness and efficiency is an important element of many practical decisions. We propose a principled and practical method for balancing these two criteria in an optimization model. Following an assessment of existing schemes, we define a set of social welfare functions (SWFs) that combine Rawlsian leximax fairness and utilitarianism and overcome some of the weaknesses of previous approaches. In particular, we regulate the equity/efficiency trade-off with a single parameter that has a meaningful interpretation in practical contexts. We formulate the SWFs using mixed integer constraints and sequentially maximize them subject to constraints that define the problem at hand. We demonstrate the method on problems of realistic size involving healthcare resource allocation and disaster preparation, with solution times of several seconds at most.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Violet Xinying & Hooker, J.N., 2022. "Combining leximax fairness and efficiency in a mathematical programming model," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 299(1), pages 235-248.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:299:y:2022:i:1:p:235-248
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2021.08.036
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tom Demeulemeester & Dries Goossens & Ben Hermans & Roel Leus, 2023. "Fair integer programming under dichotomous and cardinal preferences," Papers 2306.13383, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
    2. Violet Xinying Chen & J. N. Hooker, 2023. "A guide to formulating fairness in an optimization model," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 326(1), pages 581-619, July.
    3. Lanqing Du & Jinwook Lee, 2023. "Workforce pDEI: Productivity Coupled with DEI," Papers 2311.11231, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.

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