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Allocating Objects in a Network of Caches: Centralized and Decentralized Analyses

Author

Listed:
  • Mohit Tawarmalani

    (Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907)

  • Karthik Kannan

    (Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907)

  • Prabuddha De

    (Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907)

Abstract

We analyze the allocation of objects in a network of caches that collaborate to service requests from customers. A thorough analysis of this problem in centralized and decentralized setups, both of which occur in practice, is essential for understanding the benefits of collaboration. A key insight offered by this paper is that an efficient implementation of cooperative cache management is possible because, in the centralized scenario, the object allocation resulting in the best social welfare can be found easily as a solution to a transportation problem. For the decentralized scenario involving selfish caches, it is shown that pure equilibria exist and that the cache network always reaches a pure equilibrium in a finite number of steps, starting from any point in the strategy space. An auction mechanism is developed to derive prices that motivate the caches to hold objects in a manner such that the optimal social welfare is attained. In the special case of symmetric caches, simple algorithms are devised to find the optimal social welfare allocation, the best pure equilibrium, and the prices for sharing objects. The results obtained in this paper should be valuable in developing and evaluating cache-management policies. Resource-sharing problems with a similar cost structure exist in a variety of other domains, and the insights gained here are expected to extend to those scenarios as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohit Tawarmalani & Karthik Kannan & Prabuddha De, 2009. "Allocating Objects in a Network of Caches: Centralized and Decentralized Analyses," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(1), pages 132-147, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:55:y:2009:i:1:p:132-147
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0923
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul Milgrom, 2000. "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 245-272, April.
    2. Anindya Datta & Kaushik Dutta & Helen Thomas & Debra VanderMeer, 2003. "World Wide Wait: A Study of Internet Scalability and Cache-Based Approaches to Alleviate It," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(10), pages 1425-1444, October.
    3. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
    4. Vijay S. Mookerjee & Yong Tan, 2002. "Analysis of a Least Recently Used Cache Management Policy for Web Browsers," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 50(2), pages 345-357, April.
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    2. Gudmundsson, Jens & Hougaard, Jens Leth & Platz, Trine Tornøe, 2023. "Decentralized task coordination," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 304(2), pages 851-864.

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