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Incentive schemes for resolving Parkinson’s Law in project management

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  • Chen, Bo
  • Hall, Nicholas G.

Abstract

Project management is a business process that supports about 30% of the world’s economic activity. Yet projects routinely suffer from the influence of Parkinson’s Law. This behavioural phenomenon routinely results in failure to deliver work that is completed early before its assigned deadline. As a consequence, the late completion of other work is not offset, and overall project performance suffers. Hence, project success rates below 40% are widely reported.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Bo & Hall, Nicholas G., 2021. "Incentive schemes for resolving Parkinson’s Law in project management," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 288(2), pages 666-681.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:288:y:2021:i:2:p:666-681
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2020.06.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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