Mechanism Design
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Citations
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- Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2009.
"The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 537-560, March.
- Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2006. "The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples," NBER Working Papers 12685, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Saez, Emmanuel & Kreiner, Claus Thustrup & Kleven, Henrik, 2006. "The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples," CEPR Discussion Papers 5978, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pascal Courty & Li Hao, 2000.
"Sequential Screening,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(4), pages 697-717.
- Pascal Courty & Li Hao, 1997. "Sequential screening," Economics Working Papers 224, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Claudio Mezzetti, 2003. "Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition," Working Papers 2003.21, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Condorelli, Daniele, 2013.
"Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 582-591.
- Daniele Condorelli, 2009. "Market and Non-Market Mechanisms for the Optimal Allocation of Scarce Resources," Discussion Papers 1483, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Type Diversity and Virtual Bayesian Implementation Creation-Date: 2000," Working Papers 2000-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, 1992. "General Equilibrium and Market Socialism: Clarifying the Logic of Competitive Markets," UCLA Economics Working Papers 672, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Charles Z. Zheng, 2000.
"Optimal Auction in a Multidimensional World,"
Discussion Papers
1282, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Charles Zheng, 2000. "Optimal Auction in a Multidimensional World," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0296, Econometric Society.
- von der Fehr, N.-H. & Harbord,D., 1998.
"Competition in Electricity Spot Markets. Economic Theory and International Experience,"
Memorandum
05/1998, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Nils-Henrik von der Fehr & David Harbord, 2002. "Competition in Electricity Spot Markets: Economic Theory and International Experience," Industrial Organization 0203006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2007.
"The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples as a Multi-Dimensional Screening Problem,"
Working Papers
2007-1, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Emmanuel Saez & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, 2008. "The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples as a Multi-Dimensional Screening Problem," 2008 Meeting Papers 472, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2007. "The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples as a Multi-Dimensional Screening Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 2092, CESifo.
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