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The impact of pay-for-percentile incentive on low-achieving students in rural China

Author

Listed:
  • Chang, Fang
  • Wang, Huan
  • Qu, Yaqiong
  • Zheng, Qiang
  • Loyalka, Prashant
  • Sylvia, Sean
  • Shi, Yaojiang
  • Dill, Sarah-Eve
  • Rozelle, Scott

Abstract

In some accountability regimes, teachers pay more attention to higher achieving students at the expense of lower achieving students. The overall goal of this study is to examine, in this type of accountability regime, the impacts of a pay-for-percentile type scheme in which incentives exist for all students but which are larger for improving the achievement of lower achieving students. Analyzing data from a large-scale randomized experiment in rural China, we find that incentives improve average achievement by 0.10 SDs and the achievement of low-achieving students by 0.15 SDs. We find parallel changes in teacher behavior and curricular coverage. Taken together, the results demonstrate that incentive schemes can effectively address teacher neglect of low-achieving students.

Suggested Citation

  • Chang, Fang & Wang, Huan & Qu, Yaqiong & Zheng, Qiang & Loyalka, Prashant & Sylvia, Sean & Shi, Yaojiang & Dill, Sarah-Eve & Rozelle, Scott, 2020. "The impact of pay-for-percentile incentive on low-achieving students in rural China," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecoedu:v:75:y:2020:i:c:s0272775719300676
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econedurev.2020.101954
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    Cited by:

    1. Filmer,Deon P. & Habyarimana,James Paul & Sabarwal,Shwetlena, 2020. "Teacher Performance-Based Incentives and Learning Inequality," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9382, The World Bank.
    2. Derek Neal & Joseph Root, 2024. "The Provision of Information and Incentives in School Assignment Mechanisms," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pay-for-percentile incentive; Student achievement; Low-achieving students; RCTs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I24 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Inequality
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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