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Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools

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Listed:
  • Leaver, Clare

    (University of Oxford)

  • Ozier, Owen

    (Williams College)

  • Serneels, Pieter

    (University of East Anglia)

  • Zeitlin, Andrew

    (Georgetown University)

Abstract

This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a pay- for-percentile or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.

Suggested Citation

  • Leaver, Clare & Ozier, Owen & Serneels, Pieter & Zeitlin, Andrew, 2020. "Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools," IZA Discussion Papers 13696, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13696
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    Cited by:

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    2. Matteo Bobba & Tim Ederer & Gianmarco León-Ciliotta & Christopher A. Neilson & Marco Nieddu, 2021. "Teacher compensation and structural inequality: Evidence from centralized teacher school choice in Perú," Economics Working Papers 1788, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    3. Jörg L. Spenkuch & Edoardo Teso & Guo Xu, 2023. "Ideology and Performance in Public Organizations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1171-1203, July.
    4. Paweł Doligalski & Abdoulaye Ndiaye & Nicolas Werquin, 2023. "Redistribution with Performance Pay," Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(2), pages 371-402.
    5. Clare Leaver & Owen Ozier & Pieter Serneels & Andrew Zeitlin, 2021. "Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(7), pages 2213-2246, July.
    6. Evans, David K. & Yuan, Fei & Filmer, Deon, 2022. "Teacher pay in Africa: Evidence from 15 countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    7. Dustan, Andrew & Hernandez-Agramonte, Juan Manuel & Maldonado, Stanislao, 2023. "Motivating bureaucrats with behavioral insights when state capacity is weak: Evidence from large-scale field experiments in Peru," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    8. Florian Englmaier & Gerd Muehlheusser & Andreas Roider & Niklas Wallmeier, 2022. "Management and Performance in the Public Sector: Evidence from German Municipalities," CESifo Working Paper Series 10060, CESifo.
    9. Yue-Yi Hwa & Clare Leaver, 2021. "Management in education systems," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 37(2), pages 367-391.
    10. Brutti, Zelda & Sánchez Torres, Fabio, 2022. "Turning around teacher quality in Latin America: Renewed confidence and lessons from Colombia," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 62-93.
    11. Busso, Matías & Alfonso, Mariana & Ñopo, Hugo R. & Rivera Bianchi, Antonella Maria & Yentzen, Triana, 2024. "Becoming a Teacher: Experimental Evidence from an Information Intervention," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 13821, Inter-American Development Bank.
    12. Philipp Barteska & Jay Euijung Lee, 2024. "Bureaucrats and the Korean export miracle," Discussion Papers 2024-11, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
    13. Crawfurd, Lee, 2021. "Accounting for repetition and dropout in contemporaneous cross-section learning profiles: Evidence from Rwanda," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    14. Aisha J Ali & Javier Fuenzalida & Margarita Gómez & Martin J Williams, 2021. "Four lenses on people management in the public sector: an evidence review and synthesis," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 37(2), pages 335-366.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    teachers; incentives; selection; pay-for-performance; field experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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