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Testing the Participation Constraint in the Executive Labour Market

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  • Ian Gregory-Smith
  • Brian G. M. Main

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  • Ian Gregory-Smith & Brian G. M. Main, 2016. "Testing the Participation Constraint in the Executive Labour Market," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 63(4), pages 399-426, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:63:y:2016:i:4:p:399-426
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