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How Executive Directors’ Remuneration is Determined in Two FTSE 350 Utilities

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  • Ruth Bender

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on directors’ remuneration by reporting the results of interview‐based research carried out with executive and non executive directors at two listed UK utilities, and their advisors. The findings on how directors’ pay is set reflect aspects of both economic and social‐psychological theories. They show that the level and structure of remuneration were clearly influenced by the market, and highlight the problems of determining a suitable comparator market. Institutional theory influences were identified in the level and structure of the pay, and the way in which trends in practices influenced the protagonists. Furthermore, the way in which the companies’ policies were tailored to their corporate strategies was consistent with contingency theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruth Bender, 2003. "How Executive Directors’ Remuneration is Determined in Two FTSE 350 Utilities," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 206-217, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:11:y:2003:i:3:p:206-217
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8683.00319
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    Cited by:

    1. Geiler, Philipp & Renneboog, Luc, 2015. "Are female top managers really paid less?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 345-369.
    2. Ian Gregory-Smith & Brian G. M. Main, 2016. "Testing the Participation Constraint in the Executive Labour Market," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 63(4), pages 399-426, September.
    3. Geiler, P.H.M., 2012. "Essays on executive remuneration contracting : Managerial power, corporate payout, and gender discrimination," Other publications TiSEM 3c536b0d-bce3-4d1a-9f6f-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Muhammad Fayyaz Sheikh & Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah & Saeed Akbar, 2018. "Firm performance, corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(18), pages 2012-2027, April.
    5. Carlo Cambini & Sara De Masi & Laura Rondi, 2013. "Incentive Compensation and Incentive Regulation: Empirical Evidence," IEFE Working Papers 58, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    6. Harvey, Charles & Maclean, Mairi & Price, Michael, 2020. "Executive remuneration and the limits of disclosure as an instrument of corporate governance," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    7. Brian G. M. Main & Calvin Jackson & John Pymm & Vicky Wright, 2008. "The Remuneration Committee and Strategic Human Resource Management," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 225-238, May.
    8. Theeravanich, Amnaj, 2013. "Director compensation in emerging markets: A case study of Thailand," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 71-91.
    9. Carlo Cambini & Sara De Masi & Laura Rondi, 2016. "CEO incentives in European energy utilities: evidence from regulated versus unregulated firms," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 43(2), pages 127-155, June.
    10. Pietro Marchetti & Valeria Stefanelli, 2009. "Does the compensation level of outside director depend on its personal profile? Some evidence from UK," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 13(4), pages 325-354, November.
    11. Ruth Bender & Lance Moir, 2006. "Does ‘Best Practice’ in Setting Executive Pay in the UK Encourage ‘Good’ Behaviour?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 75-91, August.
    12. Hristos Doucouliagos & Janto Haman & Saeed Askary, 2007. "Directors' Remuneration and Performance in Australian Banking," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(6), pages 1363-1383, November.
    13. Habib Saragih, Arfah & Ali, Syaiful & Suwardi, Eko & Utomo, Hargo, 2024. "Finding the missing pieces to an optimal corporate tax savings: Information technology governance and internal information quality," International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    14. Sangyong Han & Hyejeong Mun, 2021. "CEO Compensation in Korea: Is It Different than in the US? A Comparison between Korean Non-Life Insurance Firms and US Property-Liability Insurance Firms," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-20, November.

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