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Public Preferences, Statutory Regulations and Bargaining in Field Margin Provision for Ecological Main Structures

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  • Nuppenau, Ernst-August

Abstract

Political procedures aimed at solving conflicts are becoming popular in agri-environmental economics. They are considered as substitutes for market trans­ac­tions. Ecological lobbying groups put pressure on poli­ticians to enforce ecological main structures, while farmers oppose them. Undefined property rights pose problems and statutory regulations are discussed. The paper applies a political economy model of social bargaining to the provision of an ecological main structure. It shows how a tragedy of the commons problem may prevail. Then it outlines a social optimum of field margin provision. Finally, it provides a solution to the establishment of socially acceptable rules in a political economy framework. Also, a payment scheme is introduced.

Suggested Citation

  • Nuppenau, Ernst-August, 2000. "Public Preferences, Statutory Regulations and Bargaining in Field Margin Provision for Ecological Main Structures," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aergaa:26413
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.26413
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rauscher, Michael, 1995. "Protectionists, environmentalists, and the formation of environmental policy in an open economy," Discussion Papers, Series II 256, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    2. Gordon C. Rausser & Pinhas Zusman, 1992. "Public Policy and Constitutional Prescription," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 74(2), pages 247-257.
    3. Pashigian, B Peter, 1985. "Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-interests Are Being Protected?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(4), pages 551-584, October.
    4. Gordon C. Rausser, 1992. "Predatory versus Productive Government: The Case of U.S. Agricultural Policies," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 133-157, Summer.
    5. Bartsch, Elga & Thomas, Ingo P. & Rauscher, Michael, 1993. "Environmental legislation and the impact of lobbying activities," Kiel Working Papers 562, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    6. David S. Bullock, 1994. "In Search of Rational Government: What Political Preference Function Studies Measure and Assume," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 76(3), pages 347-361.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nuppenau, Ernst-August, 2001. "Agrarpolitik als Management öffentlicher Güter: Zur Ökonomik der dezentralen Bereitstellung von Natur in der Kulturlandschaft," German Journal of Agricultural Economics, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department for Agricultural Economics, vol. 50(03), pages 1-6.

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